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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  EMI's  1995  and  1996  reports  on  "Progress  towards  convergence"
1  contained,  inter  alia,  a 
Chapter on  progress  towards  legal  convergence.  "Legal  convergence"  means  the  adaptation  of 
national  legislation,  inclusive  of  statutes
2  of  NCBs,  with  a  view  to  Stage  Three.  These  reports 
described the legal basis for the reports
3
,  the benchmark provisions in the Treaty and the Statute 
for the obligation and the assessment of legal convergence
4  as well as the basic assumptions for 
such assessment
5
• They distinguished between legal convergence in the following areas: 
central bank independence; 
integration of NCBs in the ESCB; 
legislation other than statutes of NC8s
6
• 
In addition, changes in  legislation in these areas during the reporting period were also addressed. 
The present report will maintain the same structure. It will build further on the previous reports and 
attempts to  avoid  repetitions.  As  in  the  case  of  the  1995  and  1996  Convergence  Reports,  the 
present  report  is  not  exhaustive  and  does  not  prejudge  subsequent  assessments  of  legal 
convergence. 
In  order  to  put  the  observations  in  the  following  paragraphs  in  their  context,  the  main  basic 
assumptions flowing from the 1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports are summarised below. 
The  Treaty and  the  Statute
7  do  not  require  harmonisation  of  national  legislation.  National 
peculiarities may continue to exist. 
The Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute require the removal  of  incompatibilities between the 
Treaty and the Statute on  the one  hand  and  national  legislation  on  the other.
8  Neither the 
supremacy  of  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  over  national  legislation  nor the  nature  of  the 
incompatibility affect this obligation. 
The Treaty and the Statute do not prescribe the manner in which national legislation needs to 
be  adapted.  This  may  be  achieved  by  references  to  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute,  by  the 
incorporation of provisions thereof, by the simple deletion of incompatibilities or by a mixture 
of those methods. 
1  The "1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports". 
2  Statutes  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  word,  i.e.  all  statutory  provisions  which  directly  relate  to  NCBs 
irrespectively of the laws in which they are incorporated. 
3  Article 7 of the EMI's Statute and Article 109j (1) of the Treaty. 
4  See in particular Articles 107, 108 and 109e (5) of the Treaty and Articles 7 and 14 of the Statute. 
5  In particular pages 98 and 99 of the 1996 Convergence Report. 
6  This issue was first dealt with in the 1996 Convergence Report. 
7  Where  this  Report  refers  to  the  "Treaty"  and  the  "Statute",  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community and the Statute of the ESCB/ECB are meant. 
8  See Article 1  08 of the Treaty and Article 14.1  of the Statute. The obligation  to  remove  incompatibilities  in  national  provisions  extends  to  incompatibilities  with 
Treaty  and  Statute  provisions  only  and  not  to  incompatibilities  with  secondary  Community 
legislation. Also, Article 1  08 targets one specific point in time. Possible legal changes to be made at 
a later stage do not fall within its scope.  In  order to comply with Article 108, the national legislative 
procedures  must  be  accomplished  in  such  a way  that  the  compatibility  of  national  legislation  is 
ensured at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB.  Moreover, adaptations of NCB 
statutes in the field of central bank independence need also to become fully effective at the latest 
by the date of the establishment of the ESCB
9
,  whilst adaptations aiming at the integration of NCBs 
in  the ESCB would need to become effective only at the start of Stage Three for Member States 
without a derogation or at the start of their full  participation in  Monetary Union for Member States 
with a derogation or with a special status. 
2.  CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
In the 1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports, the EMI  established and elaborated a list of features 
of  central  bank  independence.  A  distinction  was  made  between  features  of  an  institutional, 
personal,  functional  and  financial  nature.  In  addition,  the  1996 Convergence  Report contained a 
description of institutional  features  of  NCBs  in  which  the  EMI  identified
10  those  provisions  in  the 
statutes of NCBs which in its view are incompatible with Treaty and Statute requirements on central 
bank independence and which therefore,  in  its view,  required adaptation. The country Annexes to 
this Chapter identify on an Article-by-Article basis incompatibilities in statutes of NCBs in the area of 
central  bank  independence.  These  incompatibilities  have to  be  read  in  the  light  of the  following 
summary  of  the  features  of  central  bank  independence  as  elaborated  in  the  1995  and  1996 
Convergence Reports. 
Institutional independence 
The EMI  is of the opinion that the following rights of third parties (e.g. government, parliament) are 
incompatible with the Treaty and/or the Statute and therefore require adaptation: 
rights of third parties to give instructions to NCBs or their decision-making bodies as far as 
ESCB-related tasks are concerned; 
rights of third parties to approve, suspend, annul or defer decisions of NCBs as far as ESCB-
related tasks are concerned; 
a right to censor,  on  legal  grounds,  decisions  relating to the performance of  ESCB-related 
tasks (also if this right is granted to the Governor of an NCB); 
9  This  follows  from  Articles  108  and  109e  (5)  of  the  Treaty.  Protocol  No.  12  of  the  Treaty  on  certain 
provisions relating to Denmark states that the Danish Government shall notify the Council of its position 
concerning participation in Stage Three before the Council makes its assessment under Article 1  09j (2) of 
the  Treaty.  Denmark has  already  given  notification  that  it  will  not  participate  in  Stage  Three  and,  in 
accordance with Article 2 of the  Protocol No.  12,  Denmark will therefore be treated as a country with a 
derogation.  The  implications  thereof  were  elaborated  in  a  Decision  taken  by  the  Heads  of  State  or 
Government at their Edinburgh Summit meeting on  11  and 12 December 1992. This Decision states that 
Denmark will  retain  its existing powers in  the field of monetary policy according to its national laws and 
regulations,  including the powers of Danmarks Nationalbank in the field of monetary policy.  By virtue of 
Article 5 of Protocol  11  to the Treaty,  Article  108 does not apply to the  United Kingdom  as long as the 
United Kingdom has not expressed its wish to participate in Monetary Union. 
10 
Not necessarily on an exhaustive basis and without prejudice to future assessments of legal convergence 
in the area of central bank independence. 
2 a right of representatives of other bodies (e.g.  government or parliament) in decision-making 
bodies of an  NCB to vote on  matters concerning the exercise by the NCB of  ESCB-related 
tasks, even if this vote is not decisive; 
a right to be ex ante consulted on an NCB's decisions. 
Personal independence 
The  statutes  of  NCBs  must  contain  a  minimum  term  of  office  for  a  Governor and  other 
members of decision-making bodies  involved  in  the  performance of  ESCB-related tasks of 
five years.
11 
NCBs' statutes must ensure that Governors and other members of decision-making bodies 
involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks may not be dismissed for reasons other 
than  those  mentioned  in  Article  14.2 of the  Statute  (i.e.  no  longer fulfilling  the  conditions 
required for the performance of his/her duties or being guilty of serious misconduct).
12 
No  conflicts  of  interest  should  arise  between  the  duties  of  members  of  decision-making 
bodies of NCBs vis-a-vis their respective NCB (and of Governors, additionally, vis-a-vis the 
ECB) and any other functions which such members of decision making bodies involved in the 
performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks  may  have  and  which  may  jeopardise  their  personal 
independence. 
Functional independence 
NCBs in Stage Three operate in a framework whose objectives are determined by Article 1  05(1) of 
the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute (the core element of which is the primacy of maintaining price 
stability) and statutes of NCBs should leave no ambiguity with regard to this situation. This feature 
of central bank independence is also closely related to the legal  integration of NCBs in the ESCB 
(see Chapter 3 below). 
Financial independence 
NCBs should be in a position to avail themselves of the appropriate material means to ensure that 
their ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulfilled. 
,,  This,  of course,  does not  preclude  longer terms  of office,  whilst  an  indefinite  term  of office  does  not 
require the adaptation of statutes if the grounds for the dismissal of a Governor are in  line with those of 
Article  14.2.  Also,  this  general  principle would  not  exclude  a differentiation  in  terms of office  in  those 
cases where members of decision-making bodies and/or such bodies themselves are not involved in the 
performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
12  As  from  the  date  of  the  establishment  of  the  ESCB,  statutes  of  NCBs  should  contain  grounds  for 
dismissal which are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 or should not mention any grounds for 
dismissal since Article 14.2 is directly applicable. This general principle would not exclude a differentiation 
in  grounds for dismissal in  those cases where members of decision-making bodies and/or such bodies 
themselves are not involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
3 3.  LEGAL INTEGRATION OF NCBS IN THE ESCB 
Another area of legal convergence are the legislative measures required for the legal integration of 
NCBs in the ESCB. 
13  In  particular, measures may be necessary to enable NCBs to execute tasks 
as  members  of  the  ESCB  and  in  accordance  with  decisions  by  the  ECB.  The  main  areas  of 
attention are those where statutory provisions may form an obstacle to an NCB complying with the 
requirements of the ESCB or to a Governor fulfilling his/her duties as a member of the Governing 
Council of the ECB, or where statutory provisions do not respect the prerogatives of the ECB.  For 
analytical purposes, a distinction may be drawn between those areas of which statutes of NCBs are 
usually composed: statutory objectives, tasks, operations, organisation and financial provisions. 
Statutory objectives 
Integration  of  NCBs  in  the  ESCB  requires  that  their  (primary  and  secondary)  statutory 
objectives are compatible with the ESCB's objectives as laid down in Article 2 of the Statute. 
This means, inter alia, that statutory objectives with a "national flavour'', for example referring 
to an  obligation to conduct monetary policy within the framework  of the  general  economic 
policy of the Member State concerned, would need to be adapted. 
Tasks 
In Stage Three, an NCB's tasks are predominantly determined by its status as integral part of 
the ESCB and, thus, by the Treaty and the Statute. In order to comply with Article 108 of the 
Treaty, provisions on tasks in  statutes of NCBs would therefore need to be compared with 
the relevant Treaty and Statute provisions 
14 and incompatibilities would need to be removed. 
This applies in particular to any provisions which in  Stage Three form an  impediment for the 
execution of ESCB-related tasks. 
Operations 
The statutes of many, if not all, NCBs contain provisions on monetary policy operations which 
NCBs are authorised to enter into. Again,  national provisions on  such operations should be 
compared  with  those  contained  in  the  Treaty and  Statute  and  incompatibilities  should  be 
removed in order to comply with Article 108 of the Treaty. 
Organisation 
In addition to the prohibition of giving, accepting or soliciting instructions, there should be no 
mechanisms in statutes of NCBs which either would bind a Governor in  its voting behaviour 
in  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB  in  which  he/she  acts  in  the  separate  capacity  as 
member of that Council or which would prevent an NCB's decision-making bodies to comply 
with rules adopted at the level of the ECB. 
13  Article 14.3 of the Statute states that NCBs will become an  integral part of the ESCB and that they will 
have to comply with guidelines and instructions from the ECB. 
14  In particular Articles 1  05 and 1  osa of the Treaty and Articles 3 to 6 of the Statute. 
4 Financial provisions 
Financial  provisions  in  the  Statute,  which  may  be  of  particular  relevance  as  far  as  the 
identification of incompatibilities in  statutes of NCBs is concerned,  may be divided into rules 
on  accounting
15
,  auditing
16
,  capital  subscriptions
17
,  transfer  of  foreign  reserve  assets
18  and 
monetary income 
19
•  These rules imply that NCBs should  be  able to comply with  obligations 
under the relevant Treaty and Statute Articles. 
In summary, adaptations will need to ensure that the ECB's competences are being respected and 
that  there  are  no  impediments  for  NCBs  to  comply  with  the  ECB's  rules.  Also,  the  above 
enumeration of areas in  which adaptation of statutes of NCBs may be  required  is  not exhaustive. 
For example, the obligation of professional secrecy for staff of the ECB and NCBs as laid down in 
Article 38 of the Statute may have an impact on similar provisions in statutes of NCBs as well. 
4.  LEGISLATION OTHER THAN STATUTES OF NCBS 
The  obligation  of  legal  convergence  under Article  108  of  the Treaty,  which  is  incorporated  in  a 
chapter  entitled  "Monetary  Policy",  applies  to  all  areas  of  legislation  which  are  affected  by  the 
transition from Stage Two to  Stage Three of EMU. The EMI's review focuses in particular on laws 
with an impact on an NCB's performance of ESCB-related tasks and laws in the monetary field. 
15  Article 26 of the Statute. 
16  Article 27 of the Statute. 
17  Article 28 of the Statute. 
18  Article 30 of the Statute. 
19  Article 32 of the Statute. 
5 Annex 
Institutional features of the 
national central banks 
of the Member States of the European Union 
and adaptation of national legislation 
with particular emphasis on adaptation of 
statutes of the national central banks 
This  Annex  contains,  inter  alia,  descriptions  of  incompatibilities  between  the  statutes  of  the 
individual  NCBs,  on  the one  hand,  and  the Treaty  and  the  Statute,  on  the  other,  which  require 
adaptation under Article 1  08 of the Treaty. 
Such descriptions concentrate on  major incompatibilities and  are not necessarily exhaustive.  The 
EMI  has  benefited  from  NCB's contributions.  Furthermore,  they  do  not  prejudge  the  manner of 
adaptation which  national  legislators may deem fit.  In  addition,  the  descriptions prejudge  neither 
future assessments of  incompatibilities  nor of legal  convergence  in  a more  general  sense  in  the 
Member States of the European Union as they will be elaborated in future reports which the EMI is· 
required to submit under Article 109j of the Treaty and Article 7 of its Statute.  Furthermore, where 
the Annex identifies legislation other than statutes of  NCBs which  may require  adaptation with  a 
view to Stage Three,  it  is  noted that such  identification  is  of a preliminary  nature and  mainly for 
illustration purposes without prejudice to issues such as the scope and timing of any adaptations. 
For reasons of brevity, descriptions of incompatibilities are deliberately condensed and  should be 
read in conjunction with the relevant parts of this Report for further clarification. 
References  to  Articles  are  references  to  Articles  in  the  statute  of  the  NCB  concerned  unless 
indicated otherwise. References to Articles in the Treaty and the Statute are references to Articles 
in the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute of the ESCB/ECB. NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM 
1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  is  currently  contained  in  the  Organic  Law  on  the 
National Bank of Belgium of 24 August 1939 as amended and the Statutes of the National Bank of 
Belgium  of  23  September  1939 as  amended.  The  Bank  is  a  limited  liability  company  ("societe 
anonyme"),  in  which the  Belgian  State owns a controlling stake with  50%  of the shares.  General 
company law is explicitly recognised as a supplementary statutory source. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The Bank is directed by the Governor and administered by the Board of Directors, assisted by the 
Council of  Regency.  It is  supervised by the Board of  Censors.  There  is,  in  addition,  the  General 
Council. 
The Governor is appointed by the King on a nomination from Government for a renewable term of 
five  years.  The  Governor can  be  suspended  or  dismissed  by  the  King.  The  grounds  for  such 
suspension or dismissal have not been laid down in statutory provisions. 
The Board of Directors includes, in addition to the Governor, three to six members appointed by the 
King  on  a  proposal  of  the  Council  of  Regency  for  a  term  of  six  years.  No  specific  provisions 
regarding their dismissal from office are included in  the statute of the Bank.  The Board manages 
the Bank and is in charge of the orientation of policy under the control of the Council of Regency. 
The  Council  of  Regency  includes  the  Governor,  the  Directors  and  ten  Regents.  Regents  are 
appointed for three years by the general meeting of shareholders. Five are appointed on a proposal 
of  the  Minister  of  Finance,  three  on  a  proposal  from  the  most  representative  organisations  of 
industry,  commerce  and  agriculture,  and  two  on  a  proposal  of  the  most  representative  labour 
organisations. The Council of Regency has general powers to set the rates and terms of discount, 
advances and loans and approves the Annual Report on the Bank's operations. 
The Board of Censors includes eight to ten Censors elected for three years by the general meeting 
of  shareholders.  Besides  controlling  the  operations  of  the  Bank,  it  votes  on  the  budget  and 
approves the annual accounts as proposed by the Council of Regency. 
The General Council  includes the  Governor,  the  Directors,  the  Regents  and  the  Censors.  It has 
important administrative functions, and decides on the distribution of profits in accordance with the 
criteria laid down in the Organic Law. 
Membership  of  the  above  governing  bodies  is  subject  to  several  rules  on  incompatibilities  of 
functions, the most important being that members of Parliament or Government may not hold the 
office  of  Governor,  Vice-Governor,  Director,  Regent  or  Censor  and  that  the  Governor, 
Vice-Governor  and  the  Directors  may  not  exercise  any  function  on  the  boards  of  commercial 
companies, whilst Regents may not perform high-ranking functions in banks. 
While there is no right of instruction from political authorities, there is a Government Commissioner 
in the Bank who is entitled to participate without voting rights in meetings of decision-making bodies 
of  the  Bank.  A  power of  suspension  and  a  right  to  oppose  decisions  can  in  general  terms  be 
8 exercised by the Government Commissioner and the Minister of  Finance  respectively against any 
decision of the Bank contrary to the law, to the Statutes of the Bank or to the interests of the State. 
However,  by virtue of the  Law of  22  March  1993,  this  power no  longer exists with  regard  to the 
basic tasks of the Bank- namely the definition and implementation of monetary policy, the conduct 
of foreign exchange operations consistent with the exchange arrangements applicable to the franc, 
the  holding  and  management  of  the  official  foreign  reserves  and  the  promotion  of  the  smooth 
operation  of payment systems  - insofar as  the  decisions  are  in  conformity with  the  law and the 
Statutes of the Bank. In this respect, the autonomy of the Bank has thus been enhanced. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
No explicit statutory objectives are laid down in the Bank's Organic Law or its Statutes. The Bank's 
main tasks are:  the determination of monetary and  exchange rate  policy;  management of foreign 
reserves;  European  and  international  monetary  co-operation;  and  safeguarding  the  smooth 
functioning  of  payment  systems.  Other  tasks,  which  do  not  include  banking  supervision,  are 
conferred on the Bank under specific legislative provisions. 
The  Bank is  responsible  for the formulation  and  implementation  of  monetary policy.  It  conducts 
monetary  policy  in  the  context  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  which  is  determined  by  the 
Government. In particular, exchange rate arrangements are adopted by the King (the Government) 
after consultation with the Bank. The Bank can  use a wide range of monetary policy instruments. 
However, the introduction of reserve requirements requires the approval of the Government. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
There  are no  institutional  statutory relations  between  Parliament and  the Bank and,  indeed,  the 
Governor has  rarely  appeared  before  Parliament.  Regarding  relations  with  the  Government,  the 
Governor has  only rarely  attended meetings of the Council  of  Ministers.  The  Bank publishes  an 
Annual Report. The Minister of Finance has to approve the form of the weekly financial statements 
of the Bank. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
The Belgian Government and the Bank have acknowledged in  the past that the above structure 
requires the adaptation of the Bank's statute in the light of the Treaty and Statute requirements for 
Stage Three. This resulted in a draft law on the reform of the Organic Law on the National Bank of 
Belgium, which was submitted to the EMI for consultation on 1 August 1996 and on which the EMI 
delivered an  opinion  (CON/96/1 0)  on  9 September 1996. The  EMI  welcomed the  draft law as a 
comprehensive  piece  of  legislation,  both  on  central  bank  independence  as  well  as  on  the 
integration of the Bank in the ESCB. The draft law recognised that: 
9 central  bank  independence  would  need  to  be  achieved  at  the  latest  at  the  date  of 
establishment of the ECB/ESCB; 
integration provisions would need to become effective at the start of Stage Three; and 
certain provisions would need to reflect the practicalities of the transition from Stage Two to 
Stage Three, such as the envisaged date for the introduction of euro banknotes. 
The Belgian Council of State criticised the draft for having unduly reproduced provisions of both the 
Treaty and the Statute which are under Community law already directly applicable in  national  law. 
For the Council of State, it was sufficient to state in the text of the law (Article 2) that the Bank will 
form  an  integral part of the  ESCB and that it  will  be  governed by the Statute of the ESCB.  This 
opinion has led the Government to simplify the wording of the text by deleting the provisions which 
did  only  reproduce  Treaty  or  Statute  Articles.  As  a  result,  the  objectives,  the  main  tasks  and 
features of the ESCB are incorporated in Belgian law through the reference made by the law to the 
Statute of the  ESCB (see  Parliamentary Papers,  House of  Representatives,  No.  1061/1  - 96/97, 
4 June  1997).  On  July  10th  1997,  the  House  of  Representatives  adopted  the  draft,  which  was 
subsequently submitted to the Senate. 
The draft comprises, inter alia, the following provisions: 
the role of the Council of Regency is restricted to advisory tasks without an  ex ante right of 
consultation on ESCB-related tasks; 
the right of the Government Commissioner to review the legality of the Bank's activities on 
ESCB-related tasks is abolished; 
the grounds for dismissal of the Governor which are derived from Article 14.2 of the Statute 
have been extended to other members of the Board of Directors; 
the incompatibilities of  the functions  of  the  Governor and other members  of  the  Board  of 
Directors are broad enough to prevent the risk of conflicts of interest. 
5.2  Other legislation 
In addition to the legislation which will be adapted as a consequence of the new statute of the Bank, 
the Belgian Ministry of Finance has also initiated  an  examination of other legislative texts,  which 
would  need to be  reviewed with  a view to the  requirements  for Stage Three,  in  particular those 
related to the issuance of coins. The National Bank will be involved in this work, taking into account 
its role as agent for the issue of coins. Reflections are in particular necessary in order to ensure the 
appropriate degree of parallelism  in  the regime of protection of both banknotes and coins,  taking 
into account the present works in progress within the EM I. 
In addition, there are gremia with horizontal competences (a group on public administrations and a 
group on  public debt,  both  created within the Finance Ministry and the Commissariat General  in 
charge  of the  euro)  which  may take the  initiative for the  modification  of  legislation  of  whatever 
nature which  has to be  adapted,  particularly by alerting the ministerial departments in  charge of 
specific legislation or regulations. 
10 Danmarks Nationalbank 
1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  Danmarks  Nationalbank  is  contained  in  the  National  Bank  of  Denmark  Act 
(Act No.  116) of 7 April  1936.  The Bank  is  a self-governing  institution,  its  profits after allocations 
falling to the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The  governing  bodies  of  the  Bank are  the  Board  of  Governors,  the  Board  of  Directors  and  the 
Committee of Directors. 
The Board of Governors consists of three members. The Chairman is appointed by the Crown. The 
other  Governors  are  appointed  by  the  Board  of  Directors.  According  to  the  National  Bank  of 
Denmark  Act,  the  term  of  office  is  indefinite,  with  a  retirement  age  of  seventy.  The  Board  of 
Governors has full and sole responsibility for monetary policy. Governors are prevented from active 
involvement in the management of commercial organisations and companies and may not carry out 
or take part in private business activities. 
The Board of Directors consists of twenty-five members, of which two are appointed by the Royal 
Bank  Commissioner,  i.e.  the  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs.  Eight  members  are  appointed  by 
Parliament  from  among  its  members,  while  the  remaining  fifteen  are  appointed  by  the  Board  of 
Directors to ensure a broad representation of business and other sectors. The term of office is five 
years with the possibility of re-election. The Board is competent in administrative and organisational 
fields. 
The Committee of Directors consists of the two members of the Board of Directors appointed by the 
Royal  Bank  Commissioner  together  with  five  members  elected  by  the  Board  of  Directors  from 
among its members. The term of office is one year with a possibility of re-election. The Committee 
of Directors has - as does the Board of Directors - administrative and organisational competence. 
In his/her capacity as Royal Bank Commissioner, the Minister of Economic Affairs supervises  the 
Bank's  fulfilment  of  its  obligations  under  the  National  Bank  of  Denmark  Act,  and  under  the 
ordinances  and  provisions  made  pursuant  to  the  Act.  The  Royal  Bank  Commissioner  may 
participate in the meetings of the Committee of Directors, although to date never has.  For certain 
decisions  at  least  one  of  the  two  members  of  the  Committee  appointed  by  the  Royal  Bank 
Commissioner  has  to  be  present  in  order  to  form  a  quorum.  The  Royal  Bank  Commissioner 
presides over - but has no voting right at - the meetings of the Board of Directors. 
According to the Bank's by-laws, the Chairman of the Board of Governors may be dismissed by the 
Crown, the other two members by the Board of Directors. In the latter case, a majority of two-thirds 
of  the  members of  the  Board  of  Directors is  required.  No  grounds for dismissal  have  been  laid 
down. For the members of the Board of Directors and the Committee of Directors there are no rules 
relating to dismissal. 
11 3.  Objectives and tasks 
The National Bank of Denmark Act states that the Bank has the objective of maintaining a safe and 
secure currency system and of facilitating and regulating payment flows and the extension of credit. 
This is generally interpreted as implying the objective of maintaining price stability. 
Authority for monetary policy rests with the Board of Governors, including setting interest rates and 
deciding on  other monetary policy  instruments. This includes the tasks of  fixing the discount rate 
and  rates on  advances, folio account and  current account,  the issuing of  bank promissory notes 
and the purchase and sale of securities.  The  Board of Governors has full  freedom  in  formulating 
and implementing monetary policy. 
The Bank also manages official reserves and serves as fiscal agent for the Danish Government. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
With regard to relations with Parliament, eight of the twenty-five members of the Board of Directors 
are  appointed  by Parliament from  among  its  members.  There  are  no  reporting  requirements  to 
Parliament. 
With regard to relations with the Government, the Minister of Economic Affairs in  his/her capacity 
as Royal Bank Commissioner supervises the Bank's fulfilment of its obligations under the National 
Bank of  Denmark Act,  and  under the ordinances and  provisions  made  pursuant to the Act.  The 
Royal Bank Commissioner and the Minister of Finance are entitled to participate in deliberations on 
changes in the official discount rate, but without voting rights. 
The Bank is statutorily obliged to publish its annual accounts once they have been approved by the 
Board of Directors and endorsed by the Royal Bank Commissioner, together with an Annual Report. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
Protocol  No.  12 of the  Treaty on  certain  provisions  relating  to  Denmark  states that the  Danish 
government shall notify the Council of its position concerning participation in Stage Three before the 
Council  makes  its.  assessment under Article  109j  (2)  of  the Treaty.  Denmark  has  already  given 
notification that it will not participate in Stage Three and, in accordance with Article 2 of the Protocol 
No.  12, Denmark will therefore be treated as a country with a derogation. The implications thereof 
were  elaborated  in  a  Decision  taken  by  the  Heads  of  State  or Government  at  their Edinburgh 
Summit meeting on  11  and 12  December 1992. This Decision states that Denmark will  retain  its 
existing  powers  in  the  field  of  monetary  policy  according  to  its  national  laws  and  regulations, 
including the powers of Danmarks Nationalbank in the field of monetary policy.  In the light of this 
situation, there are no adaptations of the statute of the Bank or of other legislation envisaged with a 
view to Stage Three. 
12 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
1.  Legal basis 
The legal basis for the establishment of the Deutsche Bundesbank is contained in the Bundesbank 
Act of 26 July 1957 as  amended.  Further provisions can  be  found  in  the  Bundesbank Statute of 
27 November 1958, which  is based on  Section 34 of the Bundesbank Act.  The Bank is a Federal 
corporation under public law. Its capital is held by the Federal Government. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The  decision-making bodies  of  the  Bank  are  the  Central  Bank  Council,  the  Directorate  and  the 
Managing Boards of the Land Central Banks. 
The Central Bank Council consists of the President and the Deputy President of the Bundesbank, 
the other members of the Directorate and the Presidents of the Land Central Banks. 
The Directorate comprises the President, the Deputy President and up to six further members. All 
members of the Directorate are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic on a proposal of 
the Federal Government, after consultation with the Central Bank Council. 
The Managing Boards of the nine Land Central Banks consist of the President, the Vice-President 
and in six cases one further member. The Presidents of the Land Central Banks are appointed by 
the  President  of the  Federal  Republic  on  a  proposal  of  the  Bundesrat  (the  Upper  Chamber  of 
Parliament), following the submission of a proposal from the authority designated under the laws of 
the Land or Lander concerned and after consultation with the Central Bank Council. 
Members of the governing bodies are appointed for a period of  eight years.  In  exceptional cases, 
however,  appointments  may  be  for  a  shorter  period,  but  with  a  two-year  minimum.  Generally, 
appointments  are  renewable.  The  members  of  the  governing  bodies  can  be  dismissed  by  the 
President  of the Federal  Republic.  The  grounds for such  dismissal  are  defined  in  the  individual 
contracts with the Bank.  Dismissal would,  moreover,  have to follow general  principles of German 
civil  service  law,  under  which  the  grounds  for  dismissal  must  be  well  founded  (e.g.  inability  to 
perform the duties). 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The Bundesbank Act defines the main function of the Bank as the safeguarding of the currency and 
the  execution  of  domestic  and  external  payments.  Safeguarding  of  the  currency  implies  the 
objective  of  price  stability.  Without  prejudice  to  the  performance  of  its  functions,  the  Bank  is 
required to support the general economic policy of the Federal Government. 
Monetary and credit policy is determined by the Central Bank Council on  its own authority, based 
on the instruments of monetary policy determined by the Bundesbank Act. In exercising the powers 
conferred on  it  by the Bundesbank Act,  the Bank is independent of instructions from the Federal 
Government.  The  monetary  powers  conferred  on  the  Bank  are  the  issuing  and  recalling  of 
banknotes; discount, credit,  open market and minimum reserve policies and the right to order and 
13 collect  statistics  from  credit  institutions.  Within  this  statutory  framework  the  Bank  may  employ, 
develop and refine the monetary policy instruments at its discretion. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
There are no institutional statutory relations between Parliament and the Bank. 
With regard to relations with the Government, the members of the Federal Government are entitled 
to attend the meetings of the Central  Bank Council.  They have no  right to vote,  but may propose 
motions. At the request of a member of the Federal Government, a decision of the Central  Bank 
Council can be deferred for up to two weeks. This right has not been used to date. In addition, the 
Government is involved in the appointment procedure as described above. 
Finally,  the  Bank  publishes  Monthly  and  Annual  Reports.  Its  annual  accounts  are  verified  by 
auditors and by the Federal Court of Auditors. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
The German Government and the  Bank have acknowledged in  the past that the above structure 
requires adaptation of the Bank's statute in the light of Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage 
Three. This resulted in a draft Act amending the Bundesbank Act which was submitted to the EMI 
for consultation  on  12  May  1997  and  on  which  the  EMI  delivered  an  opinion  {CON/97/10)  on 
30 May 1997. The EMI welcomed the draft Act as it strengthens the independence of the Bank and 
acknowledges the Bank's integration in the ESCB in Stage Three of Monetary Union with a view to 
Article 108 of the Treaty. In its opinion, the EMI noted the following: 
14 
The EMI welcomes the timely and efficient legislative action to clarify the legal situation of the 
German central bank in the light of requirements of the Treaty and Article 1  08 thereof. This 
applies in particular with regard to the reorganisation of the responsibility for monetary policy 
resulting from the entry into the third stage of monetary union. 
With regard to the specific provision the EMI  appreciates that Section 3 of the draft Act on 
the primary objective and task of the Bundesbank incorporates the concept of price stability 
of Article 1  05{1) of the Treaty and confirms the principle of the national central banks being 
an integral part of the European System of Central Banks as laid down in  Article 14.3 of the 
Statute of the  ESCB.  It takes  note that the  revised  wording  of  Section 3  reflects the legal 
acknowledgement of obligation of the Bundesbank to implement, within the framework of the 
ESCB,  the  monetary policy adopted  by the Governing  Council  of the ECB.  The  EMI  also 
agrees that the pledge of secrecy provided for in Section 32 of the Bundesbank Act does not 
obstruct communications with the ECB on monetary developments and measures. 
The amendment of Section 6{1) reflects the transfer of the responsibility of the Central Bank 
Council for determining monetary policy to the Governing Council of the ECB and confirms 
the conformity of actions of the Bundesbank with  guidelines and instructions of the  ECB in 
accordance  with  Article  14.3  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  The  EMI  does  not  see  any 
interference with that principle by the Central  Bank Council  determining the Bundesbank's 
business policy or by the mention of discussions of implications of  monetary policy by this body. It acknowledges that in these respects no organisational change of the Bundesbank is 
intended. 
The  EMI  acknowledges that the  amendments to  Section  7  and  Section  8 fully  reflect  the 
requirements concerning the  minimum term  of office of the  Governor of  a  national  central 
bank according to Article  14.2 of  the Statute of  the  ESCB.  It  welcomes that  the  minimum 
term of office also of the other members of decision-making bodies of the Bundesbank has 
been increased to five years. 
The EMI welcomes the repealing of Section 13(2), sentence 3,  in the Bundesbank Act which 
provision was  not  in  line with the  institutional  independence of the  national central  bank in 
accordance with Article 107 of the Treaty. 
The decision to  repeal the provisions of  Sections 15 and 16 of the  Bundesbank Act on  the 
discount, lending, open market and minimum reserve policies reflects the availability, for the 
ESCB, of monetary policy instruments under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB to fulfil 
its tasks. 
The functions of the Bundesbank are defined according to the revised section 3. 
Furthermore, the EMI noted the following in relation to the draft law: 
The draft amendment does not touch upon Section 4 which entitles the Bank to participate in 
the Bank for International Settlements and,  subject to the approval of the Federal  Cabinet, 
inter alia  in  other institutions  serving  the  purposes  of  supranational  monetary  policy.  It  is 
understood that Section 4 is to be read in the light of the prevailing Article 6.2 of the Statute 
which states that NCBs may participate in  international institutions, subject,  however, to the 
approval of the ECB. It would be welcome, for reasons of legal certainty and clarity, that this 
legal situation is adequately mirrored. 
Section  12  has  remained  unchanged  and  provides  for the  support  of  the  Bank,  without 
prejudice to the performance of  its functions, to the general economic policy of the Federal 
Cabinet. The functions of the Bundesbank are defined according to the revised Section 3. As 
the Bank will be an integral part of the ESCB which according to Article 1  05(1) of the Treaty 
and Article 2 of the Statute entails that it shall support the general economic policies in the 
Community, any support by the Bank to national economic policy has to be confined to those 
areas that do not conflict with Article 2 of  the  Statute of  the  ESCB.  The EMI  noted that it 
would  be  welcome  if  Section  12  would  explicitly  address this  issue  in  order to  avoid  any 
misinterpretation of this provision. 
The EMI noted also that, whereas it had no objections with regard to Article 108 of the Treaty 
to maintaining at this stage the provisions in  Sections 1.9 to 21,  once the ECB has adopted 
the  operational  framework  for  its  monetary  policy  at  a  later  stage,  it  may  result  in 
incompatibilities with that operational framework and legal clarity would require at that stage 
adaptation. 
Section 27 containing a provision on the distribution of profit has remained unchanged. The 
EMI would like to emphasise that this provision will have to be applied in the context of Article 
32 of the Statute of the ESCB on the allocation of monetary income of NCBs. 
5.2  Other legislation 
59 Laws and Decrees: Reference to discount rate of the Bundesbank. 
15 BANK OF GREECE 
1.  Legal basis 
The formation, powers and functions of the Bank of Greece are contained in the Statute of the Bank 
of Greece of 1928 as amended. The Bank is established as a corporation ("societe anonyme"). The 
Greek State and  State undertakings are  limited to  holding,  directly or indirectly,  shares  which  in 
aggregate amount to no  more than  one-tenth of the issued share capital  of the Bank.  Otherwise 
limits are not placed on who may become a shareholder. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The governing body of the Bank is the General Council. The General Council is entrusted with the 
general operational, administrative and financial affairs of the Bank. On issues relating to monetary 
and exchange rate policies, authority rests with the Governor, who consults an internal committee 
on monetary and credit affairs. 
The General Council is accountable to the General Meeting of shareholders. The General Meeting 
has certain specific powers reserved to it.  In particular, the General Meeting has the power,  inter 
alia,  to  approve  the  Annual  Report  and  the  accounts  of  the  Bank,  to  appoint  members  of  the 
General Council and to propose amendments to the Statute, which, subsequently, must be ratified 
by Parliament as a Law. Every person registered as holding twenty-five or more shares in the share 
capital of the Bank is entitled to attend and vote at the General Meeting. 
The  General  Council  consists  of  the  Governor,  the  Deputy  Governors  and  nine  non-executive 
Councillors.  The  Governor  and  the  Deputy  Governors  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic  of  Greece,  following  a  proposal  by  the  General  Council  which  is  endorsed  by  the 
Government,  for  renewable  four-year  terms.  The  nine  Councillors  are  elected  by  the  General 
Meeting for renewable three-year terms. 
The Governor and Deputy Governors are required to devote exclusive service to the Bank except in 
cases  where  they  are  on  the  Board  of  Directors  of  Legal  Entities  of  Public  Law,  of  State 
Undertakings, or of State Advisory Bodies. No such requirement for exclusive service applies to the 
non-executive Councillors. 
The Governor or,  in his/her absence, a Deputy Governor presides over the General Council, legally 
represents  the  Bank and,  on  behalf  of  the  General  Council,  decides  on  matters which  are  not 
specifically reserved to the General Council or the General Meeting. 
A  non-voting Government Commissioner may  be  nominated  by the  Minister of Finance.  He/she 
attends the General  Meeting and  the  meetings of the General Council  and can veto decisions if 
he/she considers them to be contrary to the Statute or any other laws of the State. However, the 
final arbiter of any such veto challenge initiated by the Government Commissioner is a Commission 
of three persons appointed to rule on such matters. One member of this Commission is chosen by 
the Government, one by the Bank and the third is agreed upon between the Government and the 
Bank or, failing such agreement, by the President of the Supreme Court. 
16 3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  statutory  objective  of  the  Bank  is  to  control  the  currency  in  circulation  and  credit.  This  is 
considered to imply that monetary stability is the ultimate objective of the Bank. 
The main tasks are the implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies. 
The  Bank  formulates  monetary  policy  in  accordance  with  the  Government's  macroeconomic 
objectives,  particularly those  relating  to  inflation,  output  and  exchange  rate  policy.  Interest  rates 
applying to government paper are, however, set by the Government, albeit in  consultation with the 
Bank. 
Exchange  rate  policy  is  formulated  by  the  Government  in  consultation  with  the  Bank,  which  is 
responsible for its implementation. 
The Bank has the exclusive right to issue banknotes. It also manages official reserves.  In addition, 
the Bank is the banking supervisory authority and plays a key role in the country's payment system. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
In addition to the Government Commissioner, there is a competent parliamentary committee which 
expresses  an  opinion  regarding  the  suitability  of  candidates  for  appointment  as  Governor. 
Accountability  is  ensured  by  the  publication  of  the  Bank's  Annual  Report  and  certain  financial 
statements. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
The  Greek Government and  the  Bank  have  acknowledged  in  the  past  that  the  above  structure 
requires  adaptation of  the  Bank's  statute  in  the  light  of the Treaty and  Statute  requirements  for 
Stage  Three.  This  resulted  in  a  draft  law  containing  provisions  relating  to  the  Bank which  was 
submitted to the EMI for consultation on 10th July 1997 and on which the EMI  delivered an opinion 
(CON/97/15}  on  27  August  1997.  The  main  objective  of  the  draft  law  is  to  establish  the 
independence of the Bank, as defined in  Article  107 of the "Treaty,  and to  ensure compatibility of 
relevant national legislation with the Treaty and the Statute as required by Article 108 of the Treaty. 
In addition, the draft law aims at updating the existing legislation relating to the Bank (for instance 
on issues concerning payment systems and prudential supervision}. The draft law also abolishes a 
number of existing legal provisions which are either obsolete or contrary to more recent legislation 
or to the draft law itself. 
17 In its opinion, the EMI noted the following: 
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The EMI  welcomes the timing and scope of the adaptation of national  legislation relating to 
the  Bank and  of  other legislation.  This enables  the  EMI  to  fulfil  its  reporting  requirements 
under Article 1  09j of the Treaty and Article 7 of its Statute in a timely manner for Greece. 
In  its  1995  and  1996  Convergence  Reports,  the  EMI  stressed  the  importance  of  timely 
adaptation of national legislation to the Treaty and  Statute requirements for Stage Three of 
EMU, distinguishing between requirements on: 
•  central bank independence which would need to become effective at the latest at the date 
of the establishment of the ESCB/ECB; 
•  integration of  NCBs in  the  ESCB which  would  need to  become effective at the date of 
adoption of the single currency by the Member State concerned; and 
•  special features of the transitional period,  i.e. the period between the date of adoption of 
the  single  currency  and  the  date  of  introduction  of  euro  banknotes  and  subsequent 
disappearance of national banknotes in the participating Member States. 
The draft law acknowledges and accommodates this distinction. 
The EMI  welcomes that the Greek authorities are using the opportunity for a more general 
review of relevant legislation with a view to the requirements of Stage Three.  Indeed, Article 
1  08 of the Treaty requires,  irrespectively for instance of the supremacy of Community law 
over national law or of the question whether national statutory provisions become obsolete, to 
remove incompatibilities between national legislation on the one hand and the Treaty on the 
other,  in  order to ensure legal clarity and certainty.  Again,  the draft law acknowledges and 
accommodates this principle,  except as far as  provisions concerning the  integration  of the 
Bank within the ESCB are concerned once Greece adopts the single currency (which will be 
further examined below). 
In the area of central bank independence, the EMI  notes with satisfaction that the draft law 
contains several provisions improving the institutional, personal and functional independence 
of the Bank.  Price stability is  mentioned as  primary objective (Article 1  ).  The definition and 
implementation  of  monetary  policy  will  be  a  responsibility  of  the  Bank,  i.e.  the  Monetary 
Policy Council which will be established under the law upon its entry into force (Article 2). A 
prohibition of external influence is explicitly provided for (Article 3).  Finally, the term of office 
of all members of the Monetary Policy Council will be six years (but see below on the initial 
and  replacement  terms  of  the  members  other  th~n the  Governor  and  the  two  Deputy 
Governors), whilst the grounds for dismissal for the Governor and the two Deputy Governors 
are in  conformity with those mentioned in  Article 14.2 of the Statute. The above elaboration 
of the principle of central bank independence generally corresponds in a straight-forward and 
transparent  manner  with  features  of  central  bank  independence  which  the  EMI  has 
developed in its 1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports. 
There are, however, three issues which require further attention. The first two remarks relate 
to the security of tenure of members of the Monetary Policy Council other than the Governor 
and the two Deputy Governors. Firstly, the grounds for dismissal for such  other members as  laid down  in  Article  6.3 of the 
draft law do  not fully correspond with  those  mentioned  in  Article  14.2 of the  Statute.  They 
contain an addition ("in particular of violation of the duties and obligations conferred upon him 
under the provisions in force, the provisions of the present law and the Statute of the Bank of 
Greece") which, also in view of the current wording of Articles 22 and 24 of the statute of the 
Bank, are not in  line with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute.  For reasons set out in the EMI's 
1995 and  1996 Convergence Reports  (see,  for example,  Chapter II,  paragraph 2.2,  of  the 
1996 Convergence Report), the security of tenure for all members of NCB's decision making 
bodies involved in  the performance of ESCB-related tasks should be  compatible with  those 
mentioned  in  Article  14.2 of  the  Statute,  unless  the  degree  of  actual  involvement  in  the 
performance of such tasks would justify a certain differentiation. 
Secondly, Article 6.3 provides that the initial and  replacement terms of office of members of 
the Monetary Policy Council other than the  Governor and the  Deputy Governors are below 
the minimum term of office of five years referred to in  Article  14.2 of the Statute.  The EMI 
appreciates that the  initial  term  of  office  may  be  inspired  by  the  wish  to  create a  rotation 
scheme in  order to strengthen independence from political authorities. At the same time the 
EM I would like to emphasise that each individual member of a decision-making body involved 
in  the performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks  should,  in  accordance  with  Article  14.2 of  the 
Statute, have the same security of tenure. 
Thirdly,  it  is  noted  that  the  competence  of  the  Monetary  Policy  Council  is  restricted  to 
monetary policy and exchange rate  policy matters and  does not extend to all  ESCB-related 
tasks as  listed  in  Article  3 of  the  Statute.  The  EMI  understands  from  Article  5.3,  second 
paragraph, of the draft law that the remaining ESCB tasks will be executed by the Governor 
which  does  not  encounter any  legal  difficulties.  However,  the  Greek  legislative  authorities 
may nevertheless wish to make this  more explicit in  the draft law as  the sentence "...  the 
Governor shall retain the responsibilities conferred upon him  by the Statute of the Bank and 
the legislation in force" in Article 5.3 may not be precise enough to avoid misunderstandings, 
particularly where the division of powers between the Monetary Policy Council, the Governor 
and the General Council is concerned. 
As far as the integration of the Bank in the ESCB is concerned, the EMI  notes that the draft 
law  attempts,  through  a  general  provision  in  Article  2.3,  to  eliminate  any  incompatibilities 
which may in this area exist between the draft law on the one hand and the Treaty and the 
Statute on the other once Greece adopts the single currency in accordance with the Treaty. 
The EMI acknowledges, as it did in its 1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports, that there is no 
standard method for adaptation, particularly not in the area of legal integration of NCBs in the 
ESCB.  The  EMI  also appreciates that there may  be  practical  or political considerations for 
the  Greek  authorities  to  postpone  a  more  detailed  elaboration  of  statutory  integration 
provisions until the moment arrives that Greece adopts the single currency. However, Article 
108  of  the  Treaty  requires  for  reasons  of  legal  clarity  and  certainty,  the  removal  of 
incompatibilities and this, in the view of the EMI, cannot be accomplished through a general 
provision abolishing incompatible provisions without at the same time identifying them.  The 
draft law contains various examples of provisions which would need to be  reviewed from a 
perspective of full  integration of the Bank in  the ESCB,  in  spite of the  general provision of 
Article 2 (3) of the draft law, for instance: 
19 •  The reference to the general economic policy of the Greek Government (Article 1) would 
need to take account of Article 2 of the Statute. 
•  Paragraphs (a),  (b)  and  (f)  of Article 2 on  the Bank's tasks should  recognise the ECB's 
powers;  likewise,  the  power  of  the  Monetary  Policy  Council  to  define  and  implement 
monetary  policy  (Article  6)  would  need  to  be  adapted  to  be  compatible  with  ECB's 
competences in this field. 
•  The  need  to  produce an  annual  report  on  the  monetary policy  of the  previous  and  the 
current year (Article 4.1)  would  need  to  be  reviewed  in  the  light  of  the ECB's  reporting 
obligations. 
•  Article 7.4 of  the  draft law contains a definition  of  monetary financial  institutions which 
intends to be  in  line with  definitions at a Community level as they have,  inter alia,  been 
developed within the EMI.  However, a uniform definition has  not  been developed yet as 
far as  institutions subject to minimum  reserve  requirements are  concerned,  whilst such 
definition may also change overtime. In order to avoid the need to amend the definition in 
the  future,  the  Greek  legislative  authorities  may  therefore  wish  to  refer  to  monetary 
financial institutions "as defined by the EMI/ECB or in Community law''. 
•  The provision that the exchange rate policy framework shall be determined by the Greek 
Government after consultation with the Bank (Article 12.2) will  have to be adapted once 
Greece  adopts  the  single  currency  in  order  to  reflect  the  competence  of  Community 
bodies in this field. 
The EMI  recognises that there may be various methods to accommodate the full integration 
of the Bank in the ESCB in the process towards adoption of the single currency: a revision of 
the Bank's statute, amendments through Presidential Decrees or a combination thereof. 
Finally, the EMI  notes with satisfaction that the draft law reflects the current state of thinking 
in  relation to issues such as the Statute requirement on  lending against adequate collateral 
and  the  abolition  of  the  zero  hour  rule  (retro-active  effect  of  insolvencies)  for  payment 
systems.  Incidentally,  it  is  noted that the  abolition  of the  zero  hour  rule  should,  under the 
Directive on Settlement Finality and Collateral Security as it is expected to be  adopted, also 
extend to payment systems other than the one operated by the Bank as well as to securities 
settlement systems,  but this may of course also  be  accomplished through  legislation other 
than the draft law,  particularly if the Bank is at this juncture the only relevant party in these 
areas. 
5.2  Other legislation 
The EMI  has not been notified that adaptation of legislation other than the statute of the Bank is 
envisaged at this juncture with a view to Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three. 
20 BANCO DE ESPANA 
1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  the  Banco  de  Espana  is  contained  in  Law  13/1994  dated  1  June  1994  on  the 
"Autonomy  of  the  Banco  de  Espana".  This  Law  was  enacted  with  the  purpose  of  adapting  the 
statute  of the  Bank to the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  The  Bank  is  statutorily 
defined as a "public law entity with separate legal personality and full legal capacity". The capital of 
the Bank belongs to the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The governing bodies comprise the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Governing Council and the 
Executive Commission. 
The Governor is appointed by the Crown following a proposal by the President of the Government. 
The term of office is for a non-renewable period of six years. The Governor manages the Bank and 
presides over the Governing Council and the Executive Commission. 
The Deputy Governor is appointed by the Government following a proposal by the Governor. The 
term of office is for a non-renewable period of six years. The Deputy Governor is assigned powers 
under internal Bank rules which are delegated to him by the Governor. 
The  Governing Council  is  composed of the  Governor,  the  Deputy  Governor,  six elected  Council 
members and two ex officio members: the  Director-General of  the Treasury and  Financial  Policy 
and the Vice-President of the National Stock Market Commission - with the latter two not  having 
voting rights when monetary policy matters are under discussion. The six elected Council members 
are appointed by the Government following a proposal by the Economy and Finance Minister, after 
consultation  with  the  Governor.  Elected  Council  members  serve  a  four-year  term  and  may  be 
reappointed once. The main functions of the Governing Council are to approve general guidelines 
for  action  by  the  Bank  to  fulfil  its  assigned  functions  and  to  supervise  the  implementation  of 
monetary policy by the Executive Commission. 
The  Executive Commission  is  made  up  of  the Governor,  the  Deputy  Governor and  two  elected 
Council  members.  The  Directors  General  of  the Bank attend  the  meetings  in  a  participatory but 
non-voting  capacity.  The  Executive  Commission  is  in  partjcular  responsible  for  implementing 
monetary policy subject to the guidelines of the Governing Council. 
The two elected members of the  Executive Commission are  appointed by the Governing Council 
from the Council's elected members, on a proposal by the Governor. 
Members of the Governing Council are subject to a strict regime of professional exclusivity. 
21 3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  primary  objective  of  the  Bank,  as  stated  in  Law  13/1994,  is  achieving  price  stability. 
Furthermore, without prejudice to  the objective of price stability,  monetary policy shall support the 
general economic policy of the Government. 
The Bank's main tasks are to define and  implement monetary policy;  hold and  manage reserves; 
implement exchange  rate  policy;  promote the  smooth  operation  and  the  stability  of  the  financial 
system and, in particular, of the payment system; issue banknotes and put coins into circulation; act 
as fiscal agent for the Government and supervise credit institutions. The  Bank may require credit 
institutions to  immobilise funds  by  setting a  reserve  requirement.  However,  the  use  of  monetary 
policy instruments imposing obligations on  entities other than credit institutions requires clearance 
by the Government. 
The  Banco  de  Espana  is  fully  independent  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  monetary 
policy.  Article  1  of  Law  13/1994  states  that  ''the  Bank  shall  pursue  its  activities  and  fulfil  its 
objectives with autonomy from the Administration". Furthermore, Article 10 establishes that "neither 
the Government nor any other public authority may give  instructions to the Bank regarding  either 
the objectives or the implementation of monetary policy''. 
With  regard  to  the  formulation  of  exchange  rate  policy,  Article  11  provides  that  ''following 
consultation with the Banco de Espana, the Government shall adopt the exchange rate system and 
the parity for the peseta against other currencies, which  must be compatible with the objective of 
price stability''. It is also statutorily provided that the Bank is responsible for implementing exchange 
rate policy and, to that end, the Bank may conduct the operations it deems suitable. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The  Bank  is  obliged  to  report  to  both  Parliament  and  the  Government  on  the  objectives  and 
implementation of monetary policy. It is explicitly provided that neither of these constitutional organs 
may give instructions to the Bank on monetary policy. Moreover, every year the Bank is under the 
obligation to publish the objectives of monetary policy for the year and the implementation methods 
to attain these objectives. 
The Governor may be required to attend the meetings of the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, a 
co-ordination body on which all regional autonomous gover~ments and the central government are 
represented,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  set the  rules  for the financial  discipline  of  the  regional 
governments, although without any competence in monetary policy-related issues. 
The budget of the Bank is submitted to Parliament for approval.  It is estimative in  nature (i.e.  non-
binding) and cannot be consolidated with the General State Budget nor is it subject to Government 
approval. The yearly balance sheet and profit and loss accounts are submitted to the Government 
for approval,  and are  subject to an  audit by the  Court  of Auditors.  The  estimative  nature of the 
budget submitted to Parliament for approval and the fact that the Bank's budget is not subject to 
Government  approval  are  to  be  understood  as  avoiding  any  political  interference  in  the  Bank's 
autonomous  performance  of  its  tasks  and  as  implying  that  the  General  Budget  Law  does  not 
contain provisions binding upon the Bank. 
22 5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
Article 20.3- The exclusion of voting rights for the Director-General of the Treasury and Financial 
Policy and the Vice-President of the National Stock Market Commission extends to monetary policy 
issues but not to all ESCB-related tasks. 
Personal independence 
Article 25.2 - Term of office of members of the Governing Council other than the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor is four years rather than minimally five years. 
5.2  Integration in the ESCB 
Statutory objectives 
Article 7 
1.  The Bank's  powers to  define and  implement  monetary policy  do  not  recognise the  ECB's 
powers in this field. 
2.  The  Bank's  secondary  objective  to  support  the  general  economic  policy  of  the  Spanish 
Government does not conform with the ESCB's statutory objective. 
Tasks 
1.  Banknote issuance 
Articles 7.3 (c) and (d) and 15- The Bank's exclusive right to issue banknotes and to fix the 
amount of coins does not recognise the ECB's competences in this field. 
2.  Monetary policy 
Articles 8 and 9 - The Bank's powers with  regard to the formulation and  implementation of 
monetary policy do not acknowledge the ECB's powers in this field. 
3.  Foreign exchange policy 
Article 11  - The power of the Spanish Government to qdopt the exchange rate system and 
the  parity  for  the  peseta  against  other  currencies  does  not  recognise  the  Community's 
competence  in  exchange rate arrangements and does not envisage the introduction of the 
euro. 
Operations 
1.  Article 9 - The rules on  minimum reserves do not recognise that the content thereof will be 
determined by the ECB. 
2.  Article 12 - The Bank's competence to implement the Government's exchange rate system 
does not recognise the ECB's competence in this field. 
23 5.3  Other legislation 
Law 1  0/1975 of 12 March 1975 on coinage,  restates that the currency of Spain is the peseta and 
establishes a regime for minting coins in a manner incompatible with the Treaty. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
For the time being, no prospective changes of the Bank's statute have been notified to the EM  I. 
24 BANQUE DE FRANCE 
1.  Legal basis 
The  statute of the Banque de  France is  contained  in  Law  93-980 of  4 August  1993 "Relative au 
statut  de  Ia  Banque  de  France  et  a l'activite  et  au  centrale  des  etablissements  de  credit"  as 
amended. The capital of the institution is fully owned by the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The Bank is directed by the Governor. Responsibility for monetary policy functions is vested in the 
Monetary  Policy  Council.  A  General  Council  administers  the  Bank  and  decides  in  any  matter 
beyond the competence of the Monetary Policy Council. 
The Governor and the two Vice-Governors are appointed for a renewable term of six years by the 
Government  and  cannot  be  dismissed  before  the  expiry  of  their  term  except  for  reasons  of 
incapacity or serious misconduct. The Governor chairs the Bank's decision-making bodies. 
The Monetary Policy Council  includes the Governor, two  Vice-Governors  and  six  other members 
appointed  by  Government.  The  six  other  members  have  a  non-renewable  term  of  nine  years. 
Members of the Monetary Policy Council cannot be dismissed before the expiry of their term except 
for  reasons  of  incapacity  or  serious  misconduct  and  they  are  subject  to  a  strict  regime  of 
professional  exclusivity.  The  Monetary  Policy  Council  is  responsible  for  formulating  and 
implementing monetary policy.  It can neither seek nor accept instructions from the Government or 
any other person in the performance of its duties. 
The Bank's activities other than monetary policy are governed by the General Council. The General 
Council  includes the  members of  the  Monetary  Policy Council  plus  one  member elected  by  the 
employees of the Bank. A censor or his/her alternate, appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs 
and  Finance, attends General Council meetings.  He/she may submit proposals for the approval of 
the Council and oppose any decision taken by it. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  Bank  has  the  objective  of  formulating  and  implementing  monetary  policy  with  the  aim  of 
ensuring price stability within the framework of the general economic policy of the Government. Its 
main  tasks  are  the conduct  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy;  the  management  of  official 
reserves;  European and international monetary co-operation;  and  the safeguarding of the smooth 
functioning  of  the  payment  systems.  Other  tasks  are  conferred  on  the  Bank  under  specific 
legislative provisions,  which  include balance of  payments  statistics,  and  prudential  supervision  is 
entrusted  to  a  Banking  Commission  chaired  by  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  to  which  the  Bank 
provides administrative support. 
The Bank conducts monetary policy in the context of the exchange rate regime which is determined 
by the Government. 
The  Bank can  use  a wide  range  of  monetary  policy  instruments,  including  the  establishment  of 
minimum reserves. 
25 4.  Relations with political bodies 
The  Governor must  present  an  Annual  Report,  which  includes  a description  of  monetary  policy 
operations and perspectives, to the President of the Republic and to Parliament. The Governor may 
ask to be heard by the Finance Committees of the two Chambers of  Parliament, and  he  may also 
be asked by these Committees to appear.  Financial accounts are submitted yearly to the Finance 
Committees of the two Chambers of Parliament. 
The Prime  Minister and the  Minister for Economy and  Finance  (or a  representative)  may  attend 
meetings of the Monetary Policy Council. They may present proposals but have no voting rights. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
Articles  1,  7 and  11  - The  prohibition  of  external  influence  is  restricted  to the  Governor,  Deputy 
Governors and the  members of  the  Monetary  Policy  Council,  which  is  responsible  for  monetary 
policy issues, and does, as a consequence, not extend to all ESCB-related tasks. 
5.2  Integration in the ESCB 
Statutory objectives 
Article 1 
1.  The Bank's powers to formulate and implement monetary policy do not recognise the ECB's 
powers in this field. 
2.  The Bank's obligation to carry out these activities within the framework of the Government's 
overall economic policy does not conform with the ESCB's statutory objective. 
Tasks 
1.  Banknotes issuance 
Article  5  - The  Bank's  exclusive  right  to  issue  banknotes  does  not  recognise  the  ECB's 
competence in this field. 
2.  Monetary policy 
26 
Article 7 - The power of the Monetary Policy Council to define (the terms and conditions of) 
monetary policy operations do not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 3.  Foreign exchange policy 
Article 2 
a.  The Government's powers to  determine the exchange  rate  regime  and the  parity of the 
franc,  and the task of the  Bank to  regulate the  exchange  rates  between  the franc  and 
other currencies on  behalf of the Government and  within  the  framework  of  the  general 
exchange  rate  policy  guidelines  formulated  by  the  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs  and 
Finance  do  not  envisage  the  introduction  of  the  euro  and  do  not  recognise  the 
Community's competence in exchange rate matters. 
b.  The  provisions  on  the  Bank's  task to  hold  and  manage  the  State's  gold  and  foreign 
exchange  reserves  do  not  acknowledge  the  fact  that  a  part  of  such  reserves  will  be 
transferred to the ESCB, which entails that the involvement of the Government in this field 
is not in line with the Treaty and Statute. 
c.  The Bank's right to participate in  international monetary agreements with the permission 
of  the  Minister of  Economic  Affairs  and  Finance  does  not  recognise  the  Community's 
competences in this field. 
Operations 
1.  Article 2- See the observation under ''Tasks" on foreign exchange policy (second indent). 
2.  Article 7- See the observation under "Tasks" on monetary policy. 
3.  Article 18 - The Bank's right to enter into financial operations should be without prejudice to 
the  Bank's  ESCB-related  obligations  and  particularly  ECB  approval  and  collateral 
requirements. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Under review: 
1.  Decree no  93-1278 of 3 December 1993 on  the Banque de  France whether this Decree is 
compatible with Articles 27, 32 and 33 of the Statute. 
2.  Law no 84-46 of 24 January 1984 whether all provisions are compatible with the Treaty and 
the Statute. 
3.  Decree no 94-708 of 24 July 1984, in particular Article 13. 
4.  Regulations on coinage. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
For the time being, no prospective changes of the Bank's statute have been notified to the EM I. 
27 CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND 
1.  Legal basis 
The formation, powers and functions of the Central Bank of Ireland are set out in the Central Bank 
Acts, 1942-1997. The Bank is an institution established by statute whose capital is wholly owned by 
the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The Bank is  governed by the Board of  Directors,  which consists of the  Governor and  up  to nine 
non-executive Directors. 
The Governor is  appointed by the President of Ireland on  the advice of the Government and the 
appointment is  for a renewable term of seven  years.  He/she may be  removed from  office by the 
President on the advice of the Government because of  incapacity due to ill-health,  or following a 
unanimous vote of the Board of Directors requesting that the President remove the Governor from 
office ''for cause stated". 
Members of the Board of Directors other than the Governor and "service directors" are appointed by 
the  Minister  for  Finance  for  a  term  of  five  years.  Up  to  a  maximum  of  two  Directors  can  be 
appointed  from  among  civil  servants  by  the  Minister for  Finance,  one  of  whom  is  usually  the 
Secretary of the Department of  Finance;  such  service  directors  have full  voting  powers  and  the 
length of their term of office is set at the discretion of the Minister for Finance. 
While responsibility for policy formulation and implementation rests with the Board of Directors, the 
latter has,  in  practice, delegated the day-to-day exercise and performance of this function to the 
Governor. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The primary statutory objective of the Bank is to safeguard the integrity of the currency,  which  is 
interpreted as  being the  maintenance of  price  stability.  Safeguarding of  the currency  implies the 
objective of price stability. The main tasks of the Bank are the formulation  and  implementation of 
monetary policy; the implementation of foreign exchange rate policy; the holding and managing of 
the official external reserves; managing the financial markets and overseeing the payment system; 
issuing currency;  and acting as  fiscal  agent for the Government and as  registrar of Government 
securities. The Bank is  responsible for licensing and supervising credit institutions.  Its supervisory 
responsibilities  also cover a  range  of  securities-related  activities,  including  the  Stock  Exchange, 
financial futures and options exchanges, money brokers, collective investment schemes and certain 
investment intermediaries and all entities in the International Financial Services Central. 
The  Bank  has  full  autonomy  to  formulate  and  implement  monetary  policy  and  exercises  full 
discretion  in  its  choice  and  use  of  monetary  policy  instruments.  The  Minister  for  Finance  can 
request that the Governor, on behalf of the Board, or the Board itself consult and advise with him in 
relation  to the execution  and  performance by the  Bank of  its objectives and  tasks  in  relation  to 
monetary policy. This power has never been used. 
28 While  the  determination  of  exchange  rate  policy  is  ultimately  a matter for the  Government,  the 
Minister  for Finance is obliged, by statute, to consult the Bank before making any alteration in the 
general exchange rate arrangements or any specific exchange rate adjustments. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The Bank is  required to prepare an Annual  Report and send  it to the Minister for Finance, who,  in 
turn, has the duty to present it to both Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament). Similarly, the Bank's 
annual  Statement of Accounts  is  submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor General,  who,  in  turn, 
after audit  and  certification,  is  obliged  to  send  it  to  the  Minister for  Finance,  who  presents  it  to 
Members of the  Houses of the Oireachtas. The Bank's freedom to publish  reports on  money and 
credit  issues  and  on  the  economic  situation,  outlook  and  policies  provides  a  vehicle  for 
communicating  its  views to  the wider public.  The  Annual  Report  on  its  activities  and  the  annual 
Statement of Accounts are published by the Bank.  Moreover, the Governor attends meetings of a 
Select Committee of Dail Eireann (House of Representatives). 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
1.  Section 5.4 of  the Central  Bank Act  1942 - The  right  of  service  directors to  participate  in 
meetings of the Board of Directors with a right to vote is incompatible with the requirement of 
central bank independence. 
2.  Section 6.2 of the Central Bank Act 1942 - The obligation  of the Governor or the Board of 
Directors  to  consult  with  the  Minister  of  Finance  if  requested  is  an  explicit  statutory 
mechanism which may be used to influence the decision-making process within the Bank and 
is,  therefore,  considered  to  be  incompatible  with  the  requirement  of  central  bank 
independence. 
3.  The  attendance  of  the  Governor  at  meetings  of  a Select  Committee  of  the  Dail  Efreann 
should respect the confidentiality regime of the ESCB. 
Personal independence 
Section  21 (2)  of  the  Central  Bank  Act  1942 - The  grounds  for dismissal  of  the  Governor  and 
members of the Board of Directors should be brought into line with those mentioned in Article 14.2 
of the Statute, and this applies in particular to the grounds for dismissal of the Governor who may 
currently be  dismissed ''for cause  stated".  It should  also  be  ensured that  no  conflicts of  interest 
might arise  in  relation  to the  other functions  of  non-service  directors to  the extent that they are 
involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
29 Functional independence 
Section 6.1  of the Central  Bank Act  1942 - The  statutory objective of  the  Bank to  safeguard the 
integrity of the currency does not  unambiguously reflect the primacy of  maintaining price stability 
and should therefore be adapted at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB/ECB. 
Financial independence 
Section 23 of the Central Bank Act  1989 - The  power of the Minister for Finance to regulate the 
periodical  determination  and  distribution  of  surplus  income  should  be  adapted  with  a  safeguard 
clause that this may not impede the proper performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
5.2  Integration in the ESCB 
Statutory objectives 
The Bank's statutory objective to safeguard the integrity of the currency does not unambiguously 
correspond with the ESCB's statutory objective. 
Tasks 
It is necessary to confer new specific powers on the Bank in order to enable it to participate in the 
ESCB and give effect to obligations imposed by the Treaty. 
Banknotes issues 
The Bank's exclusive right to issue banknotes, and the right of the Ministry of Finance with respect 
to coinage, do not recognise the ECB's competences in this field. 
Exchange Rates 
Provisions  in  the  Central  Bank  Acts  1942  and  1989  give  power to  Minister  of  Finance  to  set 
exchange rates and do not recognise Community competences in this field. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Coinage Act - This Act attributes powers to the Minister of Finance in  relation to the issuance of 
coins which do not respect the ECB's powers in this field. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
The  Central  Bank Act  1997 provides  for  rules  on  the  Bank's  involvement  in  payment  systems 
(e.g. oversight, realisation of collateral, netting, finality of payments), the collection of statistics and 
prudential supervision. It also introduces in effect the prohibition on public financing as contained in 
Article  104 of the Treaty in  the  Bank's statute.  Furthermore,  it  provides for an  obligation for the 
Bank's Governor to appear before a Select Committee of Dail Eireann, prohibits the Governor from 
being a director of or holding shares in credit and financial institutions, and also fixes the term of 
office of directors at  a standard period  of five years.  The EMI  was  consulted  on  the draft Act in 
1996 and delivered  its  opinion  (CON/96/04}  on  28  May 1996. The Act  came  into  effect  in  April 
1997. 
30 Further legislative provisions have been proposed which are aimed to address the issues raised  in 
paragraphs 5.1  and 5.2 above in addition to certain statutory provisions including those relating to: 
statistical information, where expansion is proposed to ensure that reporting agents designated by 
the ECB are covered; disclosure of information; accounts and  records of the Bank; insertion of the 
euro as the currency to provide for the Irish Pound's role as a national currency unit sub-division  of 
the  euro  and  to  provide  for  the  legal  tender  status  for  both  the  Irish  Pound  and  the  euro  in 
accordance with the euro regulations,  with a specific provision for the currency in  which contracts 
etc, are made during the transitional period, the transfer of assets, income or liabilities to the ECB, 
and the application of minimum reserves in accordance with Article 19.1  of the Statute. 
31 BANCA D'ITALIA 
1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  the  Banca  d'ltalia  is  contained  in  Royal  Decree  No.  1  067  of  11  June  1936  as 
amended.  Other  important  provisions  are  the  1910  codified  law  on  the  Banks  of  Issue  (Royal 
Decree No. 204 of 28 April 191 0 as amended) and Title Ill of the 1936 Banking Law (Royal Decree 
Law No. 375 of 12 March 1936 as amended). The Bank is an institution ("istituto di diritto publico") 
the capital  of  which can  only  be  owned  by certain  specific categories of  credit  institutions,  social 
security institutions and insurance institutions. The Bank's structure reflects its original status as a 
joint stock company. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The Bank is directed by the Governor, assisted by the General Manager and two Deputy General 
Managers,  and  administered  by  the  Board  of  Directors  and  the  Committee  of  the  Board  of 
Directors. Financial supervision is exercised by the Board of Auditors. A government inspector must 
take part in the meetings of the General Assembly and those of the Board of Directors. 
The Governor is appointed by the Board of Directors acting by a qualified majority for an  unlimited 
period of time; the appointment must then be approved by decree of the  President of the Republic 
on a proposal by the President of the Council of Ministers and in agreement with the Minister of the 
Treasury,  the  Council  of  Ministers  having  been  heard.  The  Governor can  be  dismissed  by  the 
Board of Directors following the  same  procedure  and  with the same majority.  The statute of the 
Bank  does  not  contain  any  grounds  for  dismissal.  The  Governor  presents  monetary  policy 
objectives to be included in the Government's annual policy planning. The Governor is in charge of 
the conduct of monetary policy. 
The  General  Manager  is  responsible  for  the  ordinary  administration  of  the  Bank  and  for 
implementing the resolutions of the Board;  in the performance of these tasks he/she is assisted by 
two  Deputy  General  Managers.  The  General  Manager  and  the  two  Deputy  General  Managers 
assist the Governor and  act  in  his/her place  when  absent or prevented  from  performing  his/her 
functions. They are appointed for an  unlimited period of time and can  be  dismissed by the Board 
following the same procedure as in the case of the Governor. 
The Board of Directors is composed of the Governor and thirteen  independent  members,  one of 
whom is elected for each of the main branches of the Bank; they must neither be members of the 
Chambers,  nor  hold  a  political  office,  nor  be  administrators,  agents,  auditors,  managers  or 
employees of credit  institutions.  The members  of  the  Board are  elected for a renewable term of 
three years by the  Shareholders'  Assembly.  No  specific  provision  regarding  their dismissal from 
office is included in the Bank's statute. The task of the Board is to administer the Bank; the Board 
does not have any powers with  respect to monetary policy measures. The General  Manager and 
the two Deputy General Managers also attend the meetings of the Board of Directors. 
The Committee of the Board of Directors is composed of the Governor and four members of the 
Board,  elected for a term  of  one  year,  renewable  by the  Board  itself.  It  assists the  Board  in  the 
administration of the Bank. 
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Assembly for a renewable term of three years.  Besides controlling the  administration of the Bank 
with regard to compatibility with laws,  regulations and the statute, it examines the balance sheet as 
proposed  by  the  Board  of  Directors  and  expresses  its  opinion  on  the  distribution  of  the  annual 
dividend. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  Italian  Constitution  states  that  the  Republic  has  a  duty  to  protect  savings,  and  this 
constitutional principle is  understood,  and applied by the Bank,  as  entailing the objective of price 
stability.  No  explicit  reference  to  the  objective  of  price  stability  is  contained  in  the  statutory 
provisions concerning the Banca d'ltalia. 
The main tasks of the Bank are the issue of banknotes (in agreement with the Government, insofar 
as their production is concerned); the conduct of monetary policy; the fixing of discount rates and 
compulsory  reserves;  the  oversight  of  payment  systems;  the  supervision  of  banks  and  other 
financial  institutions;  acting  as  fiscal  agent  for the  Government;  and  managing  official  reserves 
jointly with the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (UIC). The latter is a public entity with legal personality and 
operational  autonomy,  whose  endowment fund  was  conferred  by the  Bank.  It  is  managed  by a 
Board chaired ex officio by the Governor of the Bank.  It shares with the Bank the management of 
foreign currency reserves and is also responsible for collecting and processing balance of payment 
statistics. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The Governor may be invited to appear before parliamentary commissions. With regard to relations 
with the Government, each year, within the framework of the adoption of the economic and financial 
programme,  the  Governor presents  the  objectives  of  monetary  policy  to be  incorporated  in  the 
annual economic plan to the Government. Monetary policy actions are taken by the Bank with full 
autonomy. The Governor may be invited to meetings of the inter-ministerial committee for economic 
planning (CIPE). 
The  Treasury  has  supervisory  powers  over the  issue  of  banknotes,  and  the  administration  and-
accounting of the Bank. The Minister of the Treasury has the power to suspend and annul only the 
deliberations of the General Assembly and of the Board which are contrary to laws,  regulations or 
the statute of the Bank. 
An Annual Report and other documents are published on a regular basis. 
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changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
1.  Article 2 of Royal  Decree  Law  1284 of 23  November  1914 and  Article  5 of  Royal  Decree 
1377 of  17 June 1928 - The  power of  the  Minister of  the Treasury to fix  interest  rates  on 
certain interest-bearing current account deposits with the Bank (with the exception of those 
on  compulsory  reserves)  is  incompatible  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  on  central 
bank independence. 
2.  To  the  extent that the  Board  of  Directors  decides  on  the  issuance  of  banknotes  and  the 
conditions of the Bank's operations, the term of service of its members should be raised from 
three to five years to comply with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 
5.2  Integration in the ESCB 
Tasks 
1.  Banknotes issuance 
Various Articles (Article 1 and Article 20, second paragraph, points 1 and 2, of the Statute of 
Banca d'ltalia; Articles 4 and 142 of the Bank of issues decree; Presidential Decree 811  of 9 
November 1981) do not recognise the ECB's competences in this field. 
2.  Control of the amounts of coins and notes held by the Bank 
a.  Articles 11 0 and 111, first paragraph, point 1, and 111, last paragraph of the Bank of issue 
decree  - Consultative  duties  assigned  to  a  parliamentary  committee  chaired  by  the 
Minister of the Treasury in  matters concerning the control of the currency issued by the 
Treasury and the Bank does not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
b.  Articles  120,  122,  124(b)  of  the  Bank  of  issue  decree  - Power  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Treasury  to  control,  inter  alia,  by  means  of  inspections,  compliance  with  the  rules 
governing the movement of notes, the amounts of coins and notes held by the Bank, the 
actual  quantities of  notes  in  circulation,  held  by the  Bank's cashiers  department and ·in 
stock and of those withdrawn because worn but not yet destroyed does not acknowledge 
the ECB's competence in this field. 
c.  Article  130 of the  Bank of  issue decree - Obligation  for the Minister of  the Treasury to 
submit  a  report  to  Parliament  on  the  banknote  issue  in  the  previous  year  does  not 
recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
3.  Formulation and Implementation of monetary policy 
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a.  Law 82 of 7 February 1992 - Power  of  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  to  vary  the  official 
discount rate and the  rate  on  fixed term  advances for the purpose of controlling market 
liquidity does not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
b.  Article 10 of the Law 483 of 26 November 1993 - power of the Bank to establish reserve 
requirements for banks  and  related  rules  does  not  recognise the  ECB's powers  in  this 
field. 4.  Dealing in foreign exchange and management of the official reserves 
Article 4,  1st and 2nd paragraph of the Presidential Decree 148 of 31  March 1988 - Power of 
the  Bank  and  the  UIC  to  manage  the  official  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  to  conduct 
foreign exchange operations in  pursuit of their institutional aims on  the basis of the  powers 
they have been assigned to do not envisage the transfer of such reserves to the ESCB and 
do not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
Operations 
1.  Articles 26, 27, 29, 60, 62 of the Bank of issue decree and Articles 41, 42, from 45(2) to 53 of 
the Statute of the Banca d'ltalia as well as various other laws on  securities -These Articles 
specify and regulate the operations, classified by type, that the Bank may engage in and the 
securities  which  it  may  accept  on  an  exhaustive  basis  and  do  not  recognise  the  ECB's 
powers in this field. 
2.  Article 20,second paragraph, points 3 and 5 of the Statute of the Banca d'ltalia - Power of the 
Governing Board to establish  rules  and terms for the Bank's operations and to appoint the 
Bank's domestic and foreign correspondence do not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
3.  Articles  124(e),  128  and  131  of  Bank of  issue  decree - The  power of the  Minister of  the 
Treasury to control compliance with the binding  restrictions of the operations conducted by 
the Bank and the application of the official rate for such operations does not  recognise the 
ECB's powers in this field. 
Financial provisions 
Article 11  of law 483 of 26 November 1993 - The obligation for Banca d'ltalia to pay a contribution 
to the Ministry of Treasury related to the income accruing from the management of the compulsory 
reserves does not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
5.3  Other legislation 
On 23 July 1997, the EMI  has been consulted on  draft legislation delegating legislative powers to 
the  Italian  Government concerning the  introduction  of  the euro,  contract continuity,  conversions, 
redenomination of financial instruments, currency for accounting reporting,  payment systems,  and 
the changeover in  the public sector. The EMI  welcomes the timing and scope of the prospective 
legislation and will issue its opinion in due course. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
For the time being, no prospective changes concerning the statute of the Bank have been notified 
to the EMI. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The statute of the lnstitut Monetaire Luxembourgeois (IML) is contained in the Law of 20 May 1983 
establishing the lnstitut Monetaire Luxembourgeois as amended. The IML is a legal entity organised 
under public law whose capital is wholly owned by the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The governing bodies of the IML are the Management and the Council. 
The Management is a collegiate body, comprising the Director General and two Directors. They are 
appointed by the Grand-Duke on  a proposal by the Council of Ministers for a renewable six-year 
term. The Management is the executive body of the IML, responsible for the fulfilment of the IML's 
objectives. If there is a fundamental disagreement between the Government and the Management 
on the IML's policy and the execution of its tasks, the Government, with the consent of the Council 
of the IML, may propose to the Grand-Duke the collective, and only the collective, dismissal of the 
Management. Without prejudice to this provision,  members of the Management are not subject to 
instructions from political authorities. 
The Council  has  seven  members appointed  by  the  Council  of Ministers  for renewable  four-year 
terms. The Council provides guidelines and gives opinions on  specified activities of the IML,  and 
approves its annual accounts and yearly budget,  but has no competence in  the field of prudential 
supervision. The members of the Council are not subject to instructions from political authorities. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
Luxembourg is  linked to Belgium in  an  economic union comprising a monetary association dating 
back to 1922. The IML, created in 1983, does not at this stage exercise all the attributes of a fully-
fledged central bank, as the National Bank of Belgium currently performs a series of tasks for both 
members of the association. 
The tasks of the IML are to issue banknotes and coins; promote the stability of the currency and, to 
that effect,  oversee the proper functioning of financial  markets;  execute obligations and exercise 
rights resulting from international agreements in the monetary and financial field;  and exercise the 
prudential supervision of the financial sector. 
The "last word" in  monetary and exchange rate  policy decisions belongs to the Government,  and 
the IML only avails itself of a limited number of monetary policy instruments. Although the IML has 
the authority to regulate the use of the banking system's franc-denominated liabilities, it has never 
used this facility. 
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The  Management  of  the  IML  has  a  statutory  obligation  to  submit  an  Annual  Report,  financial 
accounts and a budget for the approval  of  the  Government.  These  documents are  forwarded  to 
Parliament. The Government-appointed auditor of the IML also draws up an annual report which is 
submitted to the  Council  of  the  IML,  the  Government  and  Parliament.  In  addition,  the  Director 
General of the IML traditionally meets for a twice-yearly exchange of views with the Parliamentary 
Committee for Budgetary and Financial Matters. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
Moving to the final stage of Monetary Union will  entail the dissolution of the monetary association 
with Belgium, with the lnstitut Monetaire Luxembourgeois taking over the full functions of the central 
bank  of  Luxembourg.  A  draft  law  on  the  lnstitut  Monetaire  Luxembourgeois  and  the  Monetary 
Status of the Grand Duchy of  Luxembourg was  submitted to Parliament  in  December 1993,  the 
enactment of which  is  still  pending.  The  draft  law was  submitted  to  the  EMI  for consultation  on 
18 February 1994 and the EMI delivered its opinion (CON/94/1) on 12 March 1994. 
The  draft states in  its "Expose  des  Motifs" that its purpose is to  implement all  Treaty provisions 
concerning Stage Two and also to introduce some features of NCBs which are to be  put in  place 
before Stage Three.  In  accordance with the draft law,  the principal objective of the  IML will  be to 
ensure price stability, while supporting the economic policy of the Luxembourg Government. A clear 
definition  of  the  basic  tasks  of  the  IML  is  also  given.  These  include  the  definition  and 
implementation of monetary policy. The IML is to conduct its affairs in accordance with the principle 
of a market economy.  However, the monetary association between  Belgium and  Luxembourg will 
remain  unchanged during Stage Two. The draft declares that additional legislation will  be  required 
in due time for Stage Three. 
Taking the existing  law and the  draft law together,  the following  Articles  require  further attention 
with a view to the requirements of Stage Three of Monetary Union. 
Institution~/ independence 
Article 5(2) of the draft law - The prohibition of external influence covers monetary policy issues but 
does not extend to all ESCB-related tasks. 
Personal independence 
Article  12.3 of the draft law  - The  grounds for dismissal for members  of the Board  of  Directors 
("incapacite durable" and not fulfilling the condition of "honorabilite personnelle") are not fully in line 
with those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute. 
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Statutory objectives 
Article 2(2) of the draft law 
1.  The  IML's  secondary  statutory  objective  to  support  the  general  economic  policy  of  the 
(Luxembourg) Government does not conform with the statutory objectives of the ESCB. 
2.  The first indent of this Article regarding the definition and implementation of monetary policy 
by the IML does not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
Tasks 
Articles 17(1) and 19(1) of the draft law - The IML's right to issue banknotes does not recognise the 
ECB's competences in this field. 
Administration 
Article  6(a)  and  (i)  of  the  draft  law  - The  Council's  competences  in  the  monetary field  and  on 
banknotes do not recognise the ECB's competences in this area. 
Financial provisions 
Article 18 of the draft law - This provision on  the transfer of  monetary income resulting from the 
issuance of banknotes does not recognise the arrangements on monetary income within the ESCB 
as laid down in Article 32 of the Statute. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Laws relating to the monetary association between Luxembourg and Belgium. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  De  Nederlandsche  Bank  is  contained  in  the  Bank  Act  1948  and  its  Articles  of 
Association  as  amended.  The  Bank  is  a  limited  liability  company  ("Naamloze  Vennootschap") 
organised under private law and  is therefore also subject to general rules of company law,  insofar 
as the application of such rules has not been explicitly excluded or would be incompatible with the 
Bank's  special  status,  while  at  the  same  time  certain  laws  governing  public  entities  are  also 
applicable to the Bank, which  reflects the public nature of its main activities. The State is the only 
shareholder. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The  Governing  Board and  the  Supervisory  Board are the governing  bodies of the  Bank and  the 
Bank Council is an advisory body. 
The Governing Board consists of the President and the Secretary, as well as no less than two (the 
current number) and no more than five Executive Directors. They are nominated by a joint meeting 
of the Governing Board and the Supervisory Board, which  presents nominations for appointments 
to  the  Crown.  The  latter  takes  a  decision  after  the  Cabinet  has  discussed  the  matter.  All 
appointments  are  for  a  renewable  seven-year  term.  Non-compliance  with  directions  from  the 
Minister of Finance (see Section 3)  is a ground for dismissal, with no other grounds being explicitly 
mentioned in the statute of the Bank. All  policy decisions of the Bank are made by the Governing 
Board, which is also fully responsible for the management of the Bank. 
The Supervisory Board  consists  of  twelve  members,  appointed  by the  Minister of  Finance for a 
renewable  term  of  four years.  It  supervises  the  Bank's  business  affairs  and  adopts  the  annual 
balance  sheet  and  profit  and  loss  account.  A  Royal  Commissioner supervises the  affairs  of the 
Bank on behalf of the Government. The Royal Commissioner has the right to attend all meetings of 
the  Bank's  shareholders  (i.e.  the  State),  the  Supervisory  Board  and  all  joint  meetings  of  the 
Governing Board and the Supervisory Board (but not of the Governing Board itself) in an  advisory . 
capacity. 
The  Bank Council consists of sixteen  members and the  Royal  Commissioner.  Its  role  is  to  offer 
advice to the Bank and the Minister of Finance on matters of the Bank's policy. Four members are 
appointed by and from the members of the Supervisory Board. The other twelve are appointed by 
the Crown, and include financial experts and representatives of industry and labour. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  statutory objective of  the  Bank is  to safeguard the value  of the  currency.  This  is  generally 
interpreted as implying the objective of maintaining price stability. 
The Bank's main tasks are to issue banknotes; facilitate domestic and external  money transfers; 
manage  official  reserves;  and  supervise  banks  and  other  financial  institutions.  The  Bank  was 
entrusted with the supervision of exchange offices by an Act of 15 December 1994. A draft of this 
Act was submitted to the EMI for consultation under Article 1  09f (6) of the Treaty and Article 5.3 of 
39 the  EMf's  Statute  on  16  February  1994  and  the  EMI  delivered  its  opinion  (CON/94/2)  on 
16 March 1994. 
The  Bank  has full  freedom  regarding  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  domestic  monetary 
policy. As the Minister of Finance is responsible to Parliament for the conduct of monetary policy, 
regular consultation takes place between the Bank and the Minister. 
In the event of major disagreement, the Minister of Finance has the authority_ to give such directions 
to  the  Governing  Board  as  he/she  deems  necessary  for  the  Bank's  policy  to  be  properly  co-
ordinated with the Government's monetary and financial policies. The Governing Board,  however, 
can state its objections to these directions and appeal to the Crown. The Crown's decision can only 
be taken by the Council of Ministers meeting in plenary session. If it is decided that the Governing 
Board has to comply with the directions, the reasoned decision of the Crown, as well as the Bank's 
objections,  are  published  in  the  official  gazette.  However,  until  now the  Minister of  Finance  has 
never exercised this statutory right to give directions; this was intended by the legislator, and  has 
continued to be considered by policy-makers, as an ultimate remedy only. 
Participation in exchange rate arrangements as well as the acceptance of changes in central rates 
is determined by the Government, after consultation with the Bank. Within the constraints imposed 
by the EMS arrangement and with due respect to the bilateral agreement between the Netherlands 
and Germany on the fluctuation margins between the guilder and the Deutsche Mark, the Bank has 
full freedom in the formulation of the strategy with respect to exchange rate policy and in the use of 
instruments (interest rates, intervention, the fluctuation margin). 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
There  are  no  institutional  statutory  relations  between  the  Bank and  Parliament.  The  Minister of 
Finance is accountable to Parliament for the conduct of monetary policy. As required by the Bank 
Act,  the Governing Board publishes a weekly summary balance sheet of the  Bank.  Furthermore, 
the Bank publishes an Annual Report (including the annual accounts) on its activities. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
The  Netherlands  Government  and  the  Bank  have  acknowledged  in  the  past  that  the  above 
structure  requires  the  adaptation  of  the  Bank's  statute  in  the  light  of  the  Treaty  and  Statute 
requirements for Stage Three. This resulted in a draft Bank Act 1998 containing new provisions on 
the Nederlandsche Bank N.V. The draft act was submitted to the EMI  for consultation on 15 April 
1997 and the EMI delivered an opinion (CON/97/08) on 4 June 1997. The EMI welcomed the draft 
Act as  a comprehensive  piece  of  legislation,  both  on  central  bank independence  as  well  as  on 
integration of the Bank in the ESCB. The draft law recognises that: 
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central  bank  independence  would  need  to  be  achieved  at  the  latest  at  the  date  of  the 
establishment of the ECB/ESCB; 
integration provisions would need to become effective at the start of Stage Three; and certain provisions would need to reflect the practicalities of the transition from  Stage Two to 
Stage Three, such as the envisaged date for the introduction of euro banknotes. 
In its opinion, the EMI noted particularly the following: 
The  EMI  welcomes  the  timely  and  accurate  adaptation  of  the  statute  of  the  Bank.  As 
mentioned  in  the  EMI's  1995  and  1996  reports  on  "Progress  towards  convergence"  (the 
"1995 and  1996 Convergence Reports"),  timely adaptation  is  necessary to  enable the  EMI 
and other Community institutions to assess, pursuant to their reporting obligations under the 
Treaty, progress made towards the fulfilment of the legal requirements for Stage Three. 
The EMI  notes with particular satisfaction that the Bank's independence will  now be  de jure 
formalised through a deletion of the Minister of Finance's right to give instructions to the Bank 
as from the date of the establishment of the ESCB/ECB. This is in  line with the EMI's views 
on central bank independence as expressed in the 1995 and 1996 Convergence Reports. 
The EMI  also welcomes that the supervisory powers of a Government representative in  the 
Supervisory  Board  and  his/her  ancillary  competence  to  obtain  information  have  been 
restricted  to  non-Treaty  related  activities  of  the  Bank.  However,  this  restriction  has  to  be 
derived from the reference in Article 13, section 1  , to Article 2, section 1  , of the draft Act and 
may be less clear than intended. It seems, on the one hand, obvious that this reference, inter 
alia,  embraces  Article  3  but  not  Article  4.  However,  as  both  Articles  refer  to  payment 
systems, it may, on the other hand,  be questioned where the borderline of the Government 
representative's  powers  lies  in  this  respect.  Such  uncertainty  may  be  resolved  through 
reference in Article 13, section 1  , to "activities performed in the framework of the ESCB" or 
similar words rather than to "activities performed in order to achieve the objective described 
in Article 2, section 1". 
Furthermore,  the  EMI  notes  with  satisfaction  that  the  recitals  of  the  draft  Act  explicitly 
mention that the Bank will  become an  integral part of the ESCB. This is  such an  important 
observation  that  it  might  merit  an  explicit  reference  in  the  draft Act  itself,  for example  in 
Article 2,  Section 1,  although,  admittedly, the last sentence of Article 5 covers this point as 
well, but in a more general, less explicit sense. 
An explicit reference to the integration of the Bank in the ESCB may also accommodate the 
following concern.  As  mentioned in  the  1995  and  199~ Convergence  Reports,  there  is  no 
prescribed method of adaptation. Adaptations may range,  in  a spectrum, from deletions, to 
references  to  Treaty  Articles,  to  incorporations  of  (parts  of  texts)  of  Treaty  Articles  into 
statutes of national central banks.  The method which has  been chosen in the present case 
has an advantage and a disadvantage. An advantage is that the draft Act provides for a full 
text of the new statute of the Bank without cross-references to Treaty Articles. This supports 
legal clarity.  The disadvantage of this method is that it may sometimes seem  that national 
legislators or national central banks would still have an own responsibility in areas which have 
actually  been  transferred  to  the  competence  of  the  ESCB/ECB.  An  example  of  this 
disadvantage might be Article 3, section 1  a, of the draft Act which states that the Bank "in the 
implementation  of the Treaty''  shall,  inter alia,  "co-define  and  implement  monetary  policy''. 
With a view to the fact that in accordance with Article 12.1  of the ESCB/ECB Statute: 
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•  the Executive Board will implement such policy; and 
•  the national central banks may be involved in the execution of monetary policy operations, 
the words "co-define and implement monetary policy" may,  certainly when  read  in  isolation, 
be confusing. It is recognised that the level of confusion is expected to be low as the recitals, 
the first sentence of Article 3,  Section 1  , the last sentence of Article 5 and the  Explanatory 
Memorandum are clear and unambiguous as far as the Bank's status is concerned. However, 
legal clarity would nevertheless be supported if: 
•  Article 2.1  would also refer to the integration of the Bank in the ESCB; 
•  the word "co-define" in Article 3,  Section 1  (a), would be replaced by an  expression which 
better reflects the actual situation; and 
•  the  last  four  words  of  Article  3,  Section  1  (a},  would  read  "execute  monetary  policy 
operations", it being recognised that the Dutch text of the draft Act already uses the word 
"execute" (''tenuitvoerleggen") rather than implement. 
Finally, the EMI notes that the draft law contains in Article 8,  section 3,  an  obligation for the 
Bank to provide uncollateralised intra-day credit to Government. Although this is presently not 
in  contradiction  with  rules  at  a  Community  level  and  particularly  not  with  the  Council 
Regulation of 13 December 1993 (EC/3603/93), it may not be excluded that such rules will be 
amended in this respect in the future. Such an amendment would imply that Article 8, section 
3,  of  the draft Act  would  have  to  be  adapted.  The  need  for  such  an  adaptation  may  be 
avoided by deletion of Article 8, section 3, which would in any case not prevent Government 
and the Bank to act as they deem fit, provided that Treaty requirements are being respected. 
5.2  Other legislation 
1.  Coinage Act 
This Act,  which  states that the guilder is  the unit of  account  in  the  Netherlands,  does  not 
envisage the introduction of the euro. 
2.  Archives Act 1995 
This  Act  grants  citizens  the  right  of  access,  under certain  restrictions  and  conditions,  to 
information contained in the archives of public bodies and entities. This Act is also applicable 
to the Bank with a view to its public function and will therefore need to be reviewed in the light 
of the confidentiality regime within the ESCB. 
The EMI has recently been consulted by the Dutch Ministry. of Finance on a draft law which serves 
three purposes: 
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it revokes the Act on the exchange rate of the guilder and replaces it by a legislative provision 
authorising the Minister of Finance to conclude, on behalf of the Netherlands and jointly with 
the Member States of the future euro area, arrangements on the exchange rate of the euro in 
relation to the currencies of those members which are not yet part of the euro area; 
it amends the 1994 Act on external financial  relations  in  order to ensure that obligations of 
De Nederlandsche Bank to comply with general guidelines from the Minister of Finance and 
to exchange information with the Minister do not contravene the Bank's Treaty obligations as 
well  in  order to ensure that the  Bank will  be  able to exchange  information with  the future 
European Central Bank; and finally,  it amends the Act on the supervision of securities traffic 1995 in  such a manner that 
the  ECB,  just  as  De  Nederlandsche  Bank,  will  not  be  subject  to  the  supervisory  regime 
applicable to  securities  institutions,  implying  that  rules  on  the  issuance  of  debt  certificates 
would also not apply to the ECB. 
The EMI, in its opinion dated 4 June 1997 (CON/97/08), welcomed the above legislation. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The  statute of  the  Oesterreichische  Nationalbank  is  contained  in  the  National  Bank Act  1984 of 
20 January 1984 as  amended.  The  Bank is a joint stock company with  special status.  Among the 
shareholders half of the capital is subscribed by the Republic. 
2.  Organisational structure 
As  a  consequence  of  the  Bank's  legal  form  as  a joint  stock  company  with  special  status,  the 
governing  bodies  of the Bank include the  General  Meeting  of  shareholders,  the  General  Council 
and the Board of Executive Directors. 
The General Meeting discharges the General Council and  the  Board  of  Executive Directors from 
responsibility for its  administration  during the preceding  year,  approves  the  annual  statement of 
account,  decides on the allocation of  profits and  elects six  members of the General  Council  and 
four auditors.  Only Austrian citizens or legal  persons and  enterprises  having their seat in  Austria 
may be  shareholders.  Half of the capital was subscribed initially (and  is  still  held)  by the Federal 
Republic, which then also decided on those persons and enterprises to be  permitted to subscribe 
the remaining capital of the Bank. 
The General Council decides on the general guidelines for monetary and credit policy,  is charged 
with the supreme direction and supervision of the conduct of all the Bank's business, and gives its 
opinion  on  draft  legislation.  It  consists  of  the  President,  two  Vice  Presidents  and  eleven  other 
members, the latter performing this duty as an  honorary office. The President is appointed by the 
President of the Republic on nomination by the Federal Government. The Vice Presidents, as well 
as  the  five  other  members  not  elected  by  the  General  Meeting,  are  appointed  by  the  Federal 
Government. The term of office in all cases is a five-year period which can be renewed. 
The  Board  of  Executive  Directors  is  responsible  for the  overall  administration  of  the  Bank  and 
conducts  the  business  of  the  Bank  in  accordance  with  the  National  Bank  Act  and  the  general 
guidelines set by the General Council. The Board of Executive Directors appoints the Bank's staff 
and  represents  the  Bank  both  in  courts  of  law  and  extrajudicially.  It  is  composed  of  the  Chief 
Executive  Director,  his/her deputy  and  up  to four  Executive  Directors  appointed  by  the  General 
Council for a term of not more than five years. 
The  President can  be  dismissed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  if  he/she ceases to meet the 
requirements set for his/her appointment or if he/she is prevented from performing his/her duties for 
more than a year. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  Bank Act  states  that  the  Bank  "shall  ensure  .. . that  the  value  of  the  Austrian  currency  is 
maintained with  regard  both to  its  domestic purchasing  power and  to  its  relationship  with  stable 
foreign currencies". This is interpreted as implying the objective of maintaining price stability. With 
regard to the credit policy of the Bank, due regard has to be given to the country's economic needs. 
Furthermore,  the  Bank  Act  states  that  "in  determining  the  general  lines  of  monetary  and  credit 
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the Federal Governmenf'. 
The Bank's monetary policy instruments comprise discount and lending transactions,  open  market 
operations, minimum reserve requirements, transactions in foreign bills and foreign exchange. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The Bank has  no  reporting  requirements  to  Parliament or other entities.  With  regard to relations 
with the Government, according to the Bank Act, the "Federal Minister of Finance shall see to it that 
the Bank acts in accordance with the law and shall appoint a State Commissioner and a deputy for 
the  purpose of exercising this  right  of supervision".  The State Commissioner is  entitled to attend 
General Meetings and meetings of the General Council in an advisory capacity and to examine the 
conduct of the Bank's business. Finally, he/she has the right to raise objections against decisions of 
the General Council if he/she considers any such decision to be in conflict with existing legislation. 
Such an  objection has suspensive effect and is examined by an  Arbitration Tribunal regarding  its 
substance if the objection is not revoked by the Federal Minister of Finance within seven days. 
No  person who is in the active service of the  Republic,  or of a Land,  or who is  a member of the 
Nationalrat,  the  Federal  Council,  a  Parliament  of  a  Land,  the  Federal  Government  or  the 
Government of a Land may be a member of the General Council. Apart from the participation of the 
State Commissioner as described above,  no right is foreseen for members of the Government to 
attend meetings of the decision-making bodies. 
Finally,  the  Bank publishes an  Annual  Report and  an  annual  statement of  account as well  as a 
weekly return. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
1.  Article 45(  4) - Right of State Commissioner to raise - with suspensive effect - objections to a 
decision  of  the  General  Council  is  incompatible  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  on 
central bank independence. 
2.  Article 22, section 3 - The General Council is currently a decision-making body in  monetary 
policy matters, whilst it is, at the same time,  largely composed of representatives of various 
branches of industry who fulfil their duties towards the Bank on  a non-exclusive basis. This 
combination of responsibility for monetary policy, on the one hand, and the representation of 
the interests of third parties, on the other, creates a potential for conflicts of interest and is, 
therefore, incompatible with Treaty and Statute requirements on central bank independence. 
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Article 21.14 - The members of the Board of Executive Directors do not  have a minimum term of 
office  of five  years which  is  incompatible with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  on  central  bank 
independence. 
Functional independence 
The Bank's statutory objective to maintain the value of the Austrian currency with regard both to its 
domestic purchasing power and to its relationship with stable foreign currencies with due regard to 
the country's  economic  needs  does  not  unambiguously  reflect  the  primacy  of  maintaining  price 
stability. 
5.2  Integration in the ESCB 
Statutory objectives 
Article 4- The provision that the Bank, in determining monetary policy, shall pay due regard to the 
economic policy of the Federal Government does not conform with the ESCB's statutory objective. 
Tasks 
Article  3  - The  provision  on  the  Bank's  participation  in  international  institutions  concerned  with 
monetary co-operation does not recognise the ECB's competence in this field. 
Operations 
1.  Article 61  - The Bank's exclusive right to issue banknotes as  well  as  the  requirement of a 
permission of the Federal Minister of Finance concerning the face value of the notes do not 
recognise the ECB's competences in this field. 
2.  Article 41  - The provision that public authorities are prohibited to  draw on  the funds of the 
Bank without providing  the  counter-value  with  an  exception  with  regard  to the  discount of 
short-term Federal Treasury certificates is in contradiction with Article 104 of the EC Treaty. 
3.  Article  43  - The  provision  on  minimum  reserve  requirements  does  not  acknowledge  the 
ECB's powers in this field. 
4.  Articles 47-60- These Articles on the operations in wtlich the Bank is allowed to enter into do 
not recognise the ECB's power in this field. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Article 3,  Law on the Schilling (Schillinggesetz). - The provision that the Schilling is the only unit of 
account in Austria does not envisage the introduction of the euro. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
A  draft  of  a  new  Central  Bank  Act  is  under consideration  within  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  It  is 
envisaged that the draft will  be  submitted to the  EMI  for consultation during the summer of 1997 
and will subsequently be forwarded to Parliament. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The  statute of the  Banco de  Portugal  is  contained  in  the  Organic  Law  approved  by Decree-Law 
No. 337/90 of 30 October 1990 amended by  Decree-Law 231/95  of  12  September 1995 and  by 
Law 3/96 of 5 February 1996. Article 1  05 of the Constitution refers to the Banco de Portugal. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The Bank is managed by the Governor and the Board of Directors. It is supervised by the Board of 
Auditors and assisted by an Advisory Board. 
The Governor is appointed for a renewable term of five years by the Government on a proposal by 
the  Ministry  of  Finance.  The  Board  of  Directors  includes  the  Governor,  one  or  two  Deputy 
Governors,  and  three  to five  members,  all  appointed  by  the  Government on  a  proposal  by  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  for  a  renewable  term  of  five  years.  The  Board  manages  the  Bank.  The 
Governor has  a casting  vote  and  the  right  to  suspend  Board  decisions  and  submit them  to the 
Government. Directors are subject to a strict regime of professional exclusivity. The statute of the 
Bank does not contain any provisions regarding the dismissal for the Governor or other members of 
the Board of Directors. 
The Board of Auditors includes four members, three appointed by the Minister of Finance and one 
appointed  by the  Bank's  employees,  all  for three-year  renewable  terms.  The  Board  of  Auditors 
monitors  all  the  activities  of  the  Bank,  and  one  of  its  members  must  attend,  without  voting  or 
vetoing rights, all meetings of the Board of Directors. 
The Advisory Board includes representatives from the financial  and  economic sector and  regions 
and has advisory functions. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The  primary  objective  of  the  Bank  is  to  maintain  price  stability  taking  into  account  the  general 
economic policy of the Government. Its main tasks are to conduct monetary policy; co-operate with 
the  Government in  the definition of  the exchange  rate  policy  and  implement the  latter;  hold  and 
manage  the official  reserves;  act as intermediary  in  the  State's  international  monetary  relations; 
regulate,  promote  and  supervise  the  payment  systems;  regulate  and  implement  the  regime  for 
monetary, financial, foreign exchange and balance of payments statistics; and oversee the stability 
of  the  national  financial  system.  In  this  latter  respect  the  Bank  has  responsibility  for  banking 
supervision. 
To implement monetary policy the Bank has full  freedom  in  setting policy instruments.  However, 
"Avisos" relating to some of the features of the reserve  requirements framework and the discount 
rate (the latter not currently being in use for monetary policy purposes) are signed by the Minister of 
Finance and published in the Official Journal ("Diario da Republica"). 
The definition of the central exchange rate of the currency is the responsibility of the Government in 
co-operation  with  the  Bank.  The  Bank is  responsible  for the  management of the  exchange  rate 
within the fluctuation bands of the ERM. 
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The annual budget of  the Bank is forwarded to the Minister of Finance.  The annual accounts are 
submitted, together with the opinion  of the auditors,  to the  Minister of  Finance for approval.  The 
Bank is subject to the obligation to publish its accounts periodically. There is also a legal obligation 
for  the  Governor to  inform  Parliament  (through  one  of  its  Committees)  about  monetary  policy 
matters following the publication of the Annual Report by the Bank. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Prospective changes 
The Portuguese Government and the Bank have acknowledged in the past that the above structure 
requires adaptation of the Bank's statute in the light of Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage 
Three. This resulted in a draft law amending the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal which was 
submitted to the EMI for consultation on 25 July 1997 and on  which the EMI  delivered an opinion 
(CON/97/18) on 15 August 1997. In its opinion, the EMI noted the following: 
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The  EMI  welcomes  the  timely  and  accurate  adaptation  of  the  statute  of  the  Bank.  As 
mentioned  in  the  EMI's  1995  and  1996  reports  on  "Progress  towards  convergence"  (the 
"1995 and  1996 Convergence  Reports"), timely adaptation  is  necessary to enable the  EMI 
and  other Community  institutions to assess,  in  accordance with  their  reporting  obligations 
under the Treaty,  progress made towards the fulfilment of the legal  requirements for Stage 
Three. 
The EMI notes with particular satisfaction the comprehensive fashion in which the adaptation 
of  the  Bank's  statute  is  foreseen  in  the  draft  law,  whilst  at  the  same  time  the  different 
situations are accommodated which may occur dependent on the moment at which Portugal 
adopts the  single currency.  The draft law  is  basically  in  line  with  the  EMI's views  on  the 
adaptation of statutes of the EU central banks to the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute as 
expressed in  the  1995 and  1996 Convergence  Reports  and the overall  assessment of the 
present adaptation is therefore positive. 
Central bank independence needs to be achieved at the latest at the date of establishment of 
the  ESCB.  The  draft  law  contains  a  number  of  articles  providing  for  central  bank 
independence, which are consistent with the EMI's views on this topic. These provisions will 
apply as from the enactment of the draft law and irrespective of whether Portugal adopts the 
single currency as from the starting date of Stage Three or at a later stage. This is welcomed 
by the EMI. 
The draft law provides for the integration of the Bank in the ESCB both if Portugal becomes a 
fully participating Member State at the starting date of Stage Three and if Portugal would not 
adopt  the  single  currency  at  the  starting  date  of  Stage  Three.  The  EMI  welcomes  this 
approach. For the situation in which Portugal becomes a fully participating Member State, the 
draft law provides for a complete new statute for the Bank, which in general complies with the 
EMI's views on measures required for national central banks to become an  integral part of the ESCB, and therefore deserves a positive appraisal. The EMI would, however, like to raise 
the following detailed comments: 
(a)  Article  4  of  the  new  statute  states  that  "The  capital of the  Bank shall be 200 million 
escudos'.  If  Portugal  adopts the single currency,  the  Bank would  have  to comply with the 
requirement,  laid down in Article 4 of the draft Council Regulation on  the introduction of the 
euro, to  have its  unit  of  account  in  euro.  Therefore,  the  EMI  would  favour that the  Bank's 
statute already anticipates the future denomination of its capital in euro. 
(b)  Article 6 retains for the Bank "the exclusive right to issue banknotes' and "the exclusive 
right to put in circulation metal coins'. The EMI  notes that in  Stage Three other participating 
national central banks and the ECB may also issue euro banknotes with  legal tender status 
within the  Community and thus also  in  Portugal,  and  that therefore the  legal  monopoly of 
banknote  issuance  should  be  adapted  in  all  participating  Member States  so  as  to  legally 
permit banknote  issuance  by  other full  ESCB  participants  (but  only  such  participants;  see 
Article  105a  of  the  Treaty  and  Article  16  of  the  ESCB/ECB  Statute)  without  this  being 
contrary to existing national law. The legal monopoly for banknote issuance may, however, in 
the  transitional  period  still  be  restricted  to  banknotes  in  national  currencies  and  this 
restriction  may be retained  until  such banknotes  loose their legal  tender status.  The  same 
would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the exclusive right granted in the draft law to the Bank with 
regard to metal coins. 
(c) The provisions in Articles 8 and 9 of the draft law concerning banknotes should properly 
specify that these apply only to banknotes denominated in  Portuguese Escudos; the regime 
to be applied to euro banknotes should be common to all participating Member States. 
(d)  Article 21  (a)  suggests the possibility of exchange controls "whenever required';  for the 
sake of legal certainty the draft should make clear that such exchange controls may only be 
adopted in accordance with the Treaty. 
(e)  The  EMI  welcomes  in  particular  Article  32.2  of  the  new  statute  of  the  Bank,  which 
provides  for  the  primacy  of  the  ESCB  responsibilities  of  the  Governor  and  therefore 
constitutes an  effective legal tool to achieve a smooth and complete integration of the Bank 
in the ESCB. 
(f)  Article 53 of the new statute does not  appear to co.ntemplate  monetary income sharing 
within the ESCB; this provision will, of course, have to be applied in the context of Article 32 
of the ESCB Statute on the allocation of monetary income of NCBs. 
5.2  Other legislation 
Decree  of  22  May  1911  states  that  the  Escudo  is  the  monetary  unit  in  the  territory  of  the 
Portuguese Republic and does not anticipate the introduction of the euro. 
Decree-Law 333/81  of 7 December 1981, which gives to lmprensa Nacional - Casa de Moeda (the 
national mint) the exclusive right to produce coins does not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
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its  provisions,  namely  Article  9  which  deals  with  legal  acts  authorising  the  mintage  of 
commemorative coins (which are legal tender, according to Article 12 of the same Decree-Law) and 
defining their technical  characteristics,  designs,  volume  of  issuance  and  liberatory power do  not 
recognise the ECB's powers in this field. 
Decree-Law 178/88 of  19  May  1988  has  one  provision  (Article  4)  which  reproduces  Article  9 of 
Decree-Law 293/86  and  does,  as  stated  above,  not  recognise  the  ECB's  powers  in  the  field  of 
coins. 
Decree-Law 13/90 of 8 January 1990, which rules on foreign exchange operations, will  have to be 
reviewed in the light of the introduction of the euro.  For example, the definition of ''foreign currency" 
in Article 5.3, which includes "banknotes and coins which are legal tender in foreign countries" does 
not  anticipate that  euro  banknotes  and  coins,  notwithstanding  their status  as  legal  tender in  all 
participating Member States, will not be "foreign" currency. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The  statute  of  the  Bank  is  contained  in  the  Constitution  and  in  the  Act  on  Suomen  Pankki  of 
21  December 1925 as amended. The Bank is an  institution organised under public law. The part of 
the Bank's profit which is not employed to increase the Bank's own funds may be transferred to the 
State following a decision of Parliament to that effect. A new Act on the Bank of  Finland has been 
approved by the Parliament on 13 June 1997. The new Act will enter into force on 1 January 1998. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The governing bodies are the Parliamentary Supervisory Council and the Board. 
According to the Constitution, the Bank operates under the guarantee and the care of  Parliament 
and is supervised by the Parliamentary Supervisory Council. The nine members of the Council are 
appointed  for the  entire  parliamentary term  by  Parliament  from  among  members  of  Parliament, 
although  the  law  does  not  prevent  persons  other  than  members  of  Parliament  from  being 
appointed.  In  the  new Act  the  Council  is  mainly a supervisory authority with  restricted  decision-
making powers in respect of the Bank's administration. 
The Board of Suomen Pankki comprises the Governor, who is the Chairman,  and a maximum of 
five  members;  all  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  on  a  proposal  by  the 
Parliamentary  Supervisory  Council.  The  President  is  not  bound  to  follow  the  proposal  of  the 
Council. The term of office of Board members is presently indefinite but, according to the new Act, 
the Chairman of the Board will be appointed for a seven-year term and the other members of the 
Board for a five-year term.  In the new Act there are special provisions concerning the removal of a 
member of the Board from office to bring the Finnish statutory provisions on this aspect in line with 
the  Treaty  and  the  Statute.  According  to  the  new  Act  the  Board  has  general  decision-making 
powers;  according to the  Act  in  force,  it  decides  on  all  matters  which  have  not  been  expressly 
entrusted to the Council. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The statutory objectives of the Bank are to maintain a stable and secure monetary system and to 
assist and facilitate the circulation of money in Finland. Thus, .the Act on Suomen Pankki gives the 
Bank  responsibility  for  pursuing  the  goal  of  monetary  stability.  According  to  the  new  Act,  the 
objective of the Bank of Finland shall be to safeguard the value of money. 
According to the new Act,  the Bank's main tasks  include formulating and  implementing monetary 
policy;  holding  and  managing  foreign  currency  reserves;  and  participating  in  the  oversight  of 
payment and financial systems. The Bank has the sole right to issue legal tender. The Bank is not 
fiscal agent for the Government. Other tasks are conferred on  the Bank under specific legislative 
provisions. 
The Financial Supervisory Authority functions administratively in connection with the Bank, but acts 
independently in its decision-making. 
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requirement on the Bank to negotiate monetary policy decisions beforehand with the Government. 
According to the new Act, the Bank of Finland shall not seek or take instructions from any outside 
entity concerning its tasks related to monetary policy. 
The Bank is independent in  the  use  of  its  monetary policy instruments (open  market operations, 
credit operations, minimum reserves). 
The decision-making procedure regarding changes in the external value of the markka is defined in 
the Currency Act.  Under the Currency Act, the Council of State (the Government) takes decisions 
on  the external  value  of the markka on  a proposal  by the  Bank.  The  Parliamentary  Supervisory 
Council decides whether to make such  a proposal on  the basis of a proposal  by  the  Board.  The 
Government can then either approve the proposal as it stands or reject it. This procedure will not be 
changed when the new Act enters into force. 
If the fluctuation  range  has  been  determined for the  Finnish  markka,  the  Bank  ensures  that  its 
external  value  remains  within  that  range.  Within  that  framework,  the  Bank  has  full  freedom 
regarding  its  operations  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  If  a  serious  disturbance  occurs  in  the 
foreign exchange market, the Bank is entitled to temporarily disregard the limits on the fluctuation 
range. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The Parliamentary Supervisory Council supervises the administration and,  according to the Act in 
force, it supervises also the management of the Bank. The Council submits an annual report to the 
Parliamentary Economic Committee on the position, business and management of the Bank and on 
important matters dealt with by the Council during the year. 
A balance sheet of the Bank is published four times a month. The annual accounts and accounting 
and administration are audited by five auditors who are elected by Parliament. The Bank publishes 
an Annual Report. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Personal independence 
Articles 18 and 19 of the new Act - The President of the  Republic  may  remove the Governor or 
other members of the Board from office if the Governor or such a member is guilty of misconduct in 
office or if his/her performance has otherwise shown that he/she is not suited to continue in office or 
he/she no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his/her duties. These grounds 
for dismissal do not correspond with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute. 
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Statutory objectives 
Article 2 of the new Act - The statutory objective of Suomen Pankki shall be to safeguard the value 
of money. Without prejudice to that objective the Bank shall also support the attainment of other 
economic policy objectives and promote the stability of the financial system. This statutory objective 
does not conform with the ESCB's statutory objective. 
Tasks 
1.  Banknotes issuance 
Article 4 of the new Act - The Bank's exclusive right to issue banknotes does not recognise 
the ECB's competence in this field. 
2.  Monetary policy 
Articles 3 and 6 of the new Act - The Bank's powers to define and implement monetary policy 
does not acknowledge the ECB's competence in this field. 
Operations 
Article 6 of the new Act - The Bank's power to determine the base  rate  and  other interest rates 
which  it  applies and to determine and publish other rates of interest that are  used  as  reference 
rates does not recognise the ECB's competence in this field. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Exchange Rates 
The  Government's  competences  regarding  the  exchange  rate  of  the  markka  and  the  Bank's 
involvement in  this matter, as stipulated by the Currency Act,  do not recognise the Community's 
competences in exchange rate matters and do not envisage the introduction of the euro. 
Coins 
Article 7 of the Currency Act stipulates that the State has th~ exclusive right to mint coins for its 
own account and the Ministry of Finance, having requested an opinion on the matter from the Bank 
of Finland, decides on the face value and physical characteristics of coins. Coins shall be issued by 
the Bank of Finland and minted in such quantities as the Bank of  Finland  deems necessary for 
circulation. This arrangement does not recognise the need for approval by the ECB and the role of 
the EU Council referred to in Article 105a (2) of the Treaty. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
The Finnish legislative authorities and the Bank have acknowledged, and acted upon, the need for 
adaptations through the proposed new Act. The new Act was submitted to the EMI in draft form for 
consultation and the EMI delivered its opinion on 13 May 1996 (CON/96/5). The EMI noted in  its 
opinion that the draft legislation is a step forward towards the fulfilment of the Treaty and Statute 
53 requirements for Stage Three,  but  that  further  adaptations  will  be  necessary for  participation  in 
Monetary Union.  In  the course of the legislative procedure,  the draft legislation  has  profited from 
further  analysis  and  developments  - both  within  the  EMI  and  in  Finland  - with  regard  to  the 
appropriate legislative arrangements concerning Suomen Pankki in view of, inter alia, Article 1  08 of 
the  Treaty.  As  a  result,  amendments  to  the  draft  legislation  were  made  before  Parliamentary 
approval  of the new Act,  which  was  approved  by  Parliament  and  signed  by the  President of the 
Republic on 24 July 1997 and will enter into force on 1 January 1998. 
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1.  Legal basis 
The statute of the Bank is contained in the Constitution, the Riksdag Act and the Sveriges Riksbank 
Act (1988:1385) as amended. The Bank is an  institution organised under public law, whose capital 
is wholly owned by the State. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The  Riksbank  is  administered  by  a  Governing  Board  with  eight  members.  Seven  of  these  are 
elected  directly  by  Parliament  (the  Riksdag)  for periods  coinciding  with  the  parliamentary  term, 
which is normally four years. The eighth member is the Governor, who is elected by the other seven 
for a five-year term.  Terms  are  renewable.  Parliament  may  dismiss  members  of  the  Governing 
Board by refusing to discharge them from their responsibility for the administration of the Bank. The 
Governor may be dismissed by the other members of the Governing Board with no grounds being 
stated. The Governing Board is  responsible for all decisions of  major importance,  but,  apart from 
the Governor, Board members take no part in the day-to-day management of the Bank.  Members 
of the Governing Board may not be members of the Cabinet or of the Board of Directors of a credit 
institution. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
The Swedish Constitution makes the  Riksbank  responsible for all  matters  of  exchange  rate  and 
monetary  policy.  There  is  no  statutory  objective  for  monetary  policy,  but  the  Bank  follows  an 
inflation target which is compatible with the objective of maintaining price stability. 
The Constitution also states that the Bank shall promote a safe and efficient payment system. This 
is reflected in the Riksbank Act, inter alia in rules mandating the Bank to act as lender of last resort 
to financial institutions which are under the supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority. The 
Constitution assigns the Bank the sole right to issue banknotes and coins. 
In  addition to the tasks directly related to the constitutional mandate, the Riksbank Act states that 
the Bank shall  receive  and  make payments for the Government. The Bank is  not responsible for 
bank supervision. 
The  Bank has full  responsibility for the  formulation  and  implementation  of  monetary  policy.  The 
Riksbank  Act  specifies  the  available  policy  instruments,  but  the  use  of  these  instruments  is 
determined exclusively by the Bank.  Prior to taking decisions of  major importance, the Bank must 
consult the Minister of Finance, but the latter does not have any powers to veto or delay a decision 
by the Bank. Consequently, the Bank is independent with regard to its goals and the instruments it 
uses to achieve them. 
The rules for exchange rate  policy are the same as those for monetary policy,  i.e. the Bank has 
authority to decide on all matters of exchange rate policy, including the choice of the exchange rate 
regime and, under fixed exchange rates, the central parity rate. The Bank holds and manages the 
foreign exchange reserves. 
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Supervisory Authority to provide the Bank with statistics that it considers necessary. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The  Bank  is  responsible  to  the  Riksdag.  This  means,  for  example,  that  the  Riksdag  annually 
determines  whether to  discharge  the  Governing  Board  from  responsibility  for  its  administration 
during the preceding year. The Bank has a statutory obligation to submit an Annual Report on the 
administration of the Bank to  Parliament and to the Parliamentary Auditors.  The  Riksbank's profit 
and loss account and balance sheet at the end of the  financial  year are  approved  by  Parliament. 
The Bank's budget is decided by the Governing Board, giving the Bank budgetary independence. 
In  addition,  the Governor appears  before  hearings of the  Riksdag's  Finance  Committee three  or 
four times a year at which information is given on the monetary situation.  Recently,  some of these 
hearings have been open to the public. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
5.1  Central bank independence 
Institutional independence 
Article 42 of Sveriges Riksbank Act - The provision that,  prior to the Riksbank making a monetary 
policy decision of major importance,  the  Minister of  Finance  has to  be consulted  is  incompatible 
with Treaty and Statute requirements on central bank independence. 
Personal independence 
1.  Chapter  9,  Article  12,  of  the  Constitution  Act  - The  possibility  to  refuse  discharge  of 
responsibility  of  Board  members  and  the  possibility  for  Board  members  to  remove  the 
Governor from  his/her  appointment  without  specification  of  grounds  for  dismissal  do  not 
conform with Article 14.2 of the Statute. 
2.  Chapter 8, Article 6, of the Riksdag Act - Term of office of other members of decision-making 
bodies is normally 4 years and should be increased to at least five years. 
3.  Chapter 9, Article 12, of the Constitution Act and Article 31  of Sveriges Riksbank Act- These 
provisions allow members of Parliament to  be  members of the Bank's Governing Board as 
well.  Such an  arrangement would  be  inconsistent with the Treaty and the  Statute in  Stage 
Three. 
Functional independence 
Article 4 of Sveriges Riksbank Act - The statute of the  Bank does  not  unambiguously reflect the 
primacy of maintaining price stability. 
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Tasks 
1  .  Monetary policy 
Chapter 9,  Article 12,  of  the  Constitution Act and Article 4 of  Sveriges  Riksbank Act  - The 
Bank's powers in this field do not recognise the ECB's powers. 
2.  Exchange rate policy 
Chapter 9,  Article  12,  of the  Constitution  Act and Article 4 of  Sveriges  Riksbank Act  - The 
Bank's powers in this field do not acknowledge the Community's and ECB's competences in 
this field. 
3.  Banknotes issuance 
Chapter 9,  Article 13,  of the Constitution Act and Article 5 of  Sveriges  Riksbank Act  - The 
Bank's  exclusive  right  to  issue  banknotes  and  coins  does  not  recognise  the  ECB's 
competences in this field. 
Operations 
Article 4 of Sveriges Riksbank Act - The Bank's powers relating to the implementation of monetary 
and exchange rate policy do not recognise the ECB's power in this field. 
5.3  Other legislation 
Work is underway to identify possible needs for adaptation of  other legislation.  So far,  no  major 
inconsistencies with the Treaty have been found. 
5.4  Prospective changes 
Legislation  in  order to comply with  the requirements  of the Treaty with  a view to Stage Three of 
EMU will be proposed during the current legislative period. Amendments to the Constitution cannot 
enter into  force  before  1 January  1999 as  such  amendments  require  the  endorsements  of  two 
consecutive Parliaments. 
For information  purposes it  is  to  be  noted that  in  May  1997 five  political  parties  representing  a 
majority  in  Parliament  informally  agreed  on  a  number of  statutory  amendments  concerning  the 
future status of the Riksbank and its management structure.  A~so, a division of responsibilities in the 
field of exchange rate policy was clarified in this agreement. The EMI  has been informed that a Bill 
to Parliament is  expected in  October/November 1997 preceded by  a consultation  procedure with 
the EM I. Without prejudice to the content of the draft Bill on which the EMI will be consulted and the 
EMI's opinion thereon, the EMI is aware that the above agreement between the five political parties 
contemplates the following: 
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Public  authorities  will  be  prohibited  to  give  the  Riksbank  instructions  on  monetary  policy 
matters through a provision in the Constitution. The Riksbank Act will prohibit higher officials 
of the Bank to seek or take instructions. 
The Riksbank will no longer be obliged to consult with, but to inform, the Minister of Finance 
prior to all important monetary and exchange rate policy decisions. 
Personalmdependence 
An Executive Board of the Riksbank will be established with the task of independently taking, 
inter alia,  all  monetary policy decisions.  One of its  members  shall  be the  Governor of  the 
Bank, who will also be the President of the Executive Board.  In  addition, at least one other 
member of the Executive Board shall act as Deputy Governor. All members of the Executive 
Board will be appointed by the Governing Board of the Riksbank for six-year periods, full-time 
employed and subject to specific rules on conflicts of interest. 
The Governing Board will,  in  its  new shape,  have a supervisory function  but  no  monetary 
policy  competence.  Members  will  be  appointed  by  Parliament  from  persons  - inside  or 
outside  Parliamentary  circles  - with  broad  experience  in  social  life  and  economics.  The 
chairman and deputy chairman of the Governing Board will have the right to attend meetings 
of the Executive Board with a right to take part in discussions but with no voting right. 
An  amendment of the Constitution will provide for security of tenure of the Governor of the 
Riksbank  and the other members  of the  Executive  Board  by  regulating  that  they  can  be 
dismissed only if they no longer fulfil the conditions for performing their duties or in cases of 
serious misconduct. 
Functional independence 
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The prevailing objective for the Riksbank's monetary policy to maintain a fixed value of the 
money will be laid down by law in the Riksbank Act. BANK OF ENGLAND 
1.  Legal basis 
The Bank of England was originally formed as a corporation incorporated by Royal Charter in 1694. 
As  a corporation,  the  Bank has  powers to  own  property,  has  issued capital and  can  sue and  be 
sued in  its own name. Subsequently, much of the original Royal Charter was replaced by a further 
Royal Charter in  1946 together with the Bank of England Act 1946. The 1946 Act had the effect of 
nationalising the Bank, by transferring its capital to the Treasury. 
In  May  1997  the  Government  announced  two  initiatives  which,  when  fully  implemented  by 
legislation  in  the  current  session  of  Parliament,  will  materially change  the  Bank's  organisational 
structure, objectives and tasks and relations with political bodies.  Paragraphs 2,  3 and 4. describe 
the  position  immediately  prior  to  the  announcements;  paragraph  5  describes  briefly  the  main 
features of the Government's proposals. 
2.  Organisational structure 
The governing body of the Bank is the Court of Directors, which  is  responsible for managing the 
Bank's affairs and its internal administration. The Court of Directors consists of the Governor, the 
Deputy Governor and sixteen  Directors,  up  to four of whom  may have executive  responsibilities 
within the Bank. The Governor, Deputy Governor and the executive Directors are required to render 
their exclusive service to the  Bank.  The non-executive  Directors  are  not  placed  under any such 
obligation. 
The Governor,  Deputy Governor and  Directors are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the 
Prime  Minister.  The Governor and  the  Deputy  Governor are  appointed  for  renewable  five-year 
terms,  and Directors for renewable four-year terms. A Governor may be dismissed during his/her 
period of office under certain, specified conditions. 
Members  of  the  Court  of  Directors  are  not  individually  subject  to  instructions  from  political 
authorities.  However,  the Treasury has the  legal  power to issue "directions" to the  Bank "in  the 
public  interest" after consultation with the Governor, although this power has never formally been 
invoked. 
3.  Objectives and tasks 
There are no explicit statutory objectives in the monetary policy field.  The Banking Act 1987 gives 
the Bank,  in  its role as banking supervisor, the objective of protecting the interests of depositors. 
The  Bank's  overall  objectives,  in  practice,  are  to  maintain  the  integrity  and  the  value  of  the 
currency; maintain the stability of the financial system, both domestic and international; and seek to 
ensure the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's financial services. 
The main tasks of the Bank are to formulate advice on monetary policy; implement monetary policy; 
issue the currency;  manage official  reserves;  supervise  banks;  and  promote sound  and  efficient 
payment and settlement systems. 
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Monetary  policy  is  effected  through  short-term  interest  rates,  the  Bank  being  responsible  for 
advising on the appropriate interest rate level which will be required to achieve the inflation target. 
The  Bank's  advice  is  made  known  through  the  publication  - two  weeks  after  the  subsequent 
meeting - of the  minutes of  regular  (usually  monthly)  meetings  on  monetary policy  between  the 
Governor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
In  the  light  of  the  advice  received  from  the  Governor,  the  Chancellor  takes  decisions  on  any 
changes to the interest  rate.  The precise timing  of  such  changes  is  now delegated to the Bank. 
Interest rate objectives are pursued through the Bank's daily money market operations. 
The Bank acts as fiscal agent for the Government. 
Foreign exchange market activities are conducted by the Bank as agent for the Government, which 
owns  the  foreign  exchange  reserves.  In  carrying  out  this  function,  the  Bank  operates  within 
guidelines set by the Treasury. 
4.  Relations with political bodies 
The Bank presents an Annual Report to Parliament containing its accounts for the previous year. It 
also presents a second Annual Report to Parliament describing its conduct of banking supervision. 
In  addition,  the  Bank  publishes  a  quarterly  Inflation  Report,  which  describes  progress  towards 
achieving  the  Government's  inflation  target  and  the  Bank's  views  on  the  future  prospects  for 
inflation.  The Governor frequently appears before  Committees of  Parliament.  Formally,  however, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or another Treasury Minister, answers for the Bank in Parliament. 
As part of the monetary framework, which was adopted after the United Kingdom left the exchange 
rate  mechanism of  the  European  Monetary System,  a number of  measures  have  been  taken  to 
make the monetary policy process more transparent to the public.  As  noted above,  these include 
the announcement of a quantitative Government target for inflation, the publication of  a quarterly 
Inflation Report by the Bank, and the publication of the minutes of the regular meetings on interest 
rate policy between the Chancellor and the Governor. In addition, the Treasury publishes a monthly 
compendium of data relevant to monetary policy. 
5.  Inconsistencies  with  Treaty  and  Statute  requirements  and  prospective 
changes to the Bank's statute and other legislation 
By virtue of Article 5 of Protocol11 to the Treaty, Article 108 does not apply to the United Kingdom 
as long as the United  Kingdom  has not expressed  its  wish  to participate  in  Monetary Union.  On 
16 October 1996, the United Kingdom notified the EU Council that it did not intend to move to Stage 
Three of EMU. As a consequence, the United Kingdom does not need to adapt its legislation with a 
view to Stage Three of Monetary Union. 
On  6  May  1997  the  Chancellor  announced  several  reforms  covering  the  United  Kingdom's 
monetary policy framework. In summary, these include: 
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inflation  target  set  by  the  Government.  The  Bank  will  have  a  specific  monetary  policy 
objective of delivering price stability (as defined by the inflation target) and, without prejudice 
to  this  objective,  supporting  the  Government's  economic  policy.  If,  in  extreme  economic 
circumstances,  the  national  interest  demands  it,  the  Government  will  have  the  power 
(exercisable through subordinate legislation approved by  Parliament)  to  give  instructions to 
the Bank on  interest rates for a limited period.  The Bank will  be  required  to  account for its 
monetary  policy  actions  and  to  explain  how  it  intends  to  meet  the  inflation  target  in  its 
quarterly Inflation Report. 
Appointing a second Deputy Governor (so that there is one Deputy to support the Governor 
on  monetary  stability  and  another  to  support  the  Governor  on  financial  stability)  and 
establishing a new committee of the Bank,  the Monetary Policy committee,  comprising the 
Governor,  the  Deputy Governors and  six  members.  Operational  decisions on  interest  rate 
policy will be made by a vote of the Monetary Policy Committee. The Treasury will have the 
right to be represented on the Committee in a non-voting capacity. 
Reconstituting  the  Court  of  Directors  so  as  to  comprise  the  Governor,  the  two  Deputy 
Governors and  16 non-executive  members.  Non-executive  members  will  be  appointed  for 
three-year terms.  One  of  the  tasks  of  the  non-executive  members  will  be  to  review  the 
performance of the Monetary Policy Committee. 
Giving the Bank its own pool of foreign exchange reserves which it may use at its discretion 
in support of its monetary policy objective. 
Transferring the Bank's role  as the Government's agent for debt management,  the sale of 
gilts,  oversight  of  the  gilts  market  and  cash  management  to  the  Treasury  or  a  debt 
management agency to be established. 
On 20 May 1997 the Chancellor announced proposals to transfer the  Bank's  banking  supervisory 
responsibilities to the Securities and Investments Board, but also noting that the Bank would remain 
responsible for the overall stability of the financial system as a whole. 
It is currently proposed that the changes covering the monetary policy framework and the transfer 
of banking supervision will be introduced in the current session of Parliament. The Monetary Policy 
Committee, although not yet formally constituted, is already functioning in practice. 
Further  legislation  on  the  Bank  would  be  required  if  the  United  Kingdom  were  to  notify  the 
EU Council that it intends to move to Stage Three of EMU. 
61 